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Abstract: In Belgian law, a subjective interpretation of contracts prevails: the
common intention of the parties is the vital criterion that governs the construction of
agreements. In England the system is more objective, which means the meaning which
the document would convey to a reasonable person predominates in matters of
contractual interpretation. However, an in-depth analysis of the case Rainy Sky S. A.
and others v. Kookmin Bank shows that, in practice, the two systems are more alike
than might seem at first sight.
1. Introduction and Factual Background
On 11 May 2007, six separate sales contracts (the Contracts) were concluded
between six parties (the Buyers) and Jinse Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. (the Builder), in
which the Builder committed himself to build and sell a ship to each of the Buyers
for the price of USD 33.3 million each, payable in five equal instalments of USD
6.66 million, with the final instalment payable on delivery.
Precedent to payment of the first instalment, the Builder had to deliver a
refund guarantee to each Buyer in a form acceptable to the Buyers’ moneylenders.
On 22 August 2007, Kookmin Bank (the Bank) issued six Advance Payment
Bonds (the Bonds), one to each of the Buyers.
In late January 2009, when each of the Buyers had paid the first instalment
and one Buyer had also paid the second, the Builder became insolvent. The
Buyers notified the Builder that the installed debt workout procedure triggered an
obligation under Article XII.3 of the Contracts to refund the instalments received.
The Builder refused and the dispute was submitted to arbitration. The Buyers
then demanded from the Bank under the Bonds repayment of the instalments
paid. The Bank refused to pay because of two reasons. First, the Bank said that it
was not obliged to pay pending the dispute between the Buyers and the Builder.
Second, the Bonds did not cover refunds in the event of insolvency under Article
XII.3 of the Contracts.
The judge rejected both arguments and summary judgment was given for
the Buyers. The Bank appealed on the second ground only, and succeeded, since
the Court of Appeal gave summary judgment for the Bank. The Buyers
subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, asking whether a true construction
of paragraph 3 of the Bonds implied that they were entitled to payment under the
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Bonds of the refunds to which they were entitled under Article XII.3 of the
Contracts.
2. The Bonds
The point of departure in this case is the Bonds, since the dispute concerns the
true construction of the Bonds. The relevant part of each of the Bonds is the
following:
[3] In consideration of your agreement to make the pre-delivery instalments
under the Contract and for other good and valuable consideration (the receipt
and adequacy of which is hereby acknowledged), we hereby, as primary obligor,
irrevocably and unconditionally undertake to pay to you, your successors and
assigns, on your first written demand, all such sums due to you under the
Contract (or such sums which would have been due to you but for any
irregularity, illegality, invalidity or unenforceability in whole or in part of the
Contract) PROVIDED THAT the total amount recoverable by you under this
Bond shall not exceed US $[26,640,000] . . . plus interest thereon at the rate
of . . . (7%) per annum (or 10%) per annum in the case of a Total Loss of the
Vessel) from the respective dates of payment by you of such instalments to the
date of remittance by telegraphic transfer of such refund.
A Bond has a broad and flexible meaning in English common law, referring most
of the time to a personal security used to cover certain risks of parties to
long-term and complex contracts of transactions, such as the supply of ships.1
Such an undertaking does not create security by giving the creditor access to
certain assets but by providing for a second debtor. It is a strict undertaking
(guarantee) of a party (guarantor), normally a bank, to pay a certain sum of
money to another party, the beneficiary (creditor), under certain conditions in
order to cover a risk of that party.2 In international commerce, contracts of
guarantee governed by English common law often include clauses stating that the
guarantor has to pay on first demand and that the undertaking is unconditional.
By using these words, the parties make sure a primary and independent obligation
is constituted. It is thus typical for such bank guarantees that, on the one hand,
they secure the obligation under another contract, while, on the other hand, they
contain a primary obligation, abstract from any underlying contract. Such
1 N. HORN & E. WYMEERSCH, ‘Bank-guarantees, Standby Letters of Credit, and Performance
Bonds in International Trading’, in The Law of International Trade Finance, Kluwer Law and
Taxation Publishers, Deventer 1988, pp. 457 and 473 (hereinafter abbreviated N. HORN &
E. WYMEERSCH, 1988).
2 N. HORN & E. WYMEERSCH, 1988, p. 459.
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guarantees cover different types of risks.3 In Rainy Sky, the parties who have
made advance payments have exposed themselves to the risk that, in case of
non-performance, the money will not be refunded. Protection was guaranteed by
way of a repayment guarantee or an advance payment bond issued by the bank.
How would the Bonds in Rainy Sky S.A. and Others v. Kookmin Bank be
characterized in Belgium?
The Bonds refer to a personal security used to cover certain risks of parties
to long-term and complex contracts of transactions. However, which personal
security under Belgian law fits best in this case? In Belgian law, personal security
contracts are mainly to be distinguished in two different categories, namely
caution (Art. 2011 Code Civil (CC)), a concept called dependent personal security
in the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), and garantie, which the DCFR
refers to as independent personal security.4 The main difference, as it is clearly
pointed out by the nomenclature of the DCFR, is the independence of the
relationship between the personal security contract and the underlying agreement
between the instructing party and the beneficiary.5 In order to qualify a personal
3 G. BOSMAN, ‘Bankgaranties op eerste verzoek’, in Bijvoorbeeld. Modellen voor het bedrijfsleven,
Kluwer, Mechelen, loose-leaf, pp. IV.115-5–IV.115-6 (hereinafter abbreviated G. BOSMAN,
loose-leaf); P. DE VROEDE & M. FLAMEE, ‘De garanties op eerste verzoek’, TPR 1982, p. 369
(hereinafter abbreviated P. DE VROEDE & M. FLAMEE, 1982); N. HORN & E. WYMEERSCH,
1988, p. 458; C. MARTIN & M. DELIERNEUX, ‘Les garanties bancaires autonomes’, in
Répertoire pratique du droit belge. Législation, Doctrine et Jurisprudence. Complément. Tome
septième, Bruylant, Brussels 1990, pp. 576–578 (hereinafter abbreviated C. MARTIN &
M. DELIERNEUX, 1990); G. SCHRANS, ‘Eenvormige regels voor autonome garanties’, in Liber
Amicorum Paul De Vroede, Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen, Antwerpen 1994, pp. 1166–1167
(hereinafter abbreviated G. SCHRANS, 1994); E. WYMEERSCH, ‘Garanties op eerste verzoek’,
TPR 1986, pp. 475–476 (hereinafter abbreviated E. WYMEERSCH, 1986); J. VAN RYN &
J. HEENEN, Principes de droit commercial, III, Bruylant, Brussels 1988, pp. 516–517
(hereinafter abbreviated J. VAN RYN & J. HEENEN, 1988).
4 C. BORMS, ‘Hoe autonoom is de garantieverbintenis?’, T. Fin. R. 2007, pp. 76–78, 85–87
(hereinafter abbreviated C. BORMS, 2007); D. DE MAREZ, ‘Garantieformalisme als eerste
maatstaf bij de beoordeling van een beroep op een bankgarantie en de toepassing van deze regel
bij de beoordeling van een “extend or pay”-verzoek’, DAOR 2000, p. 309 (hereinafter
abbreviated D. DE MAREZ, 2000); D. DE MAREZ, ‘De beoordeling van het beroep op een
bankgarantie op eerste (gemotiveerd) verzoek’, AJT 2000–2001, p. 321 (hereinafter abbreviated
D. DE MAREZ, 2000–2001); N. HORN & E. WYMEERSCH, 1988, pp. 459–476.
5 Brussels 17 Nov. 1988, Pas. 1989, II, 113; Comm. C. Brussels 11 Feb. 1999, TBH 2000, p. 725,
note J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX; G. BOSMAN, loose-leaf, p. IV.115-5; J. BUYLE &
M. DELIERNEUX, ‘Garantie bancaire: interprétation et formalisme’, TBH 2000, p. 736
(hereinafter abbreviated J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX, 2000); E. DIRIX & R. DE CORTE,
Zekerheidsrechten, Story-Scientia, Antwerpen 2006, p. 300 (hereinafter abbreviated E. DIRIX &
R. DE CORTE, 2006); N. HORN & E. WYMEERSCH, 1988, p. 476; S. PIEDELIÈVRE, ‘Garantie
à première demande’, in Rép. Com. Dal. 2008, pp. 10–11 (hereinafter abbreviated
S. PIEDELIÈVRE, 2008); A. PRÜM, ‘Pratiques et Réglementations Internationales des Garanties
à Première Demande’, in L’actualité de Garanties à Première Demande – Actualia inzake
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security contract, the judge first has to interpret the agreement by searching for
the common intention of the parties (Art. 1156 et seq. CC). A characterization of
caution must be accepted when it is the will of the parties to connect the position
of the added debtor with that of the principal debtor.6 A contract is characterized
as a garantie when the obligations are formulated in an abstract way, without any
reference to the obligations of the principal debtor.7 Helpful to interpretation is
the presence of the words op eerste verzoek or à première demande, which means
on first demand, since they create a rebuttable presumption in favour of the
characterization as an independent personal security.8
In order to characterize the Bonds in this case in a proper way, the words
of Article XII.3 of the Contracts are revealing. It states that the Bank undertakes
to pay ‘as primary obligor, irrevocably and unconditionally, on your first written
demand, all such sums due to you under the Contract’. A first clue is to be found
in the words primary obligor. The Bonds constitute primary obligations, and
therefore, they cannot be a caution. Besides, the payment is irrevocable and
unconditional, which confirms the presumption of autonomy and independence
from the underlying contracts between the instructing party and the beneficiary,
which brings about the characterization of garantie as well. Also significant is the
expression on first demand, triggering a rebuttable presumption in favour of the
characterization as a garantie, namely a garantie bancaire à première demande. At
first sight, the repeated references to the Contract itself in Article XII.3 might
seem to indicate dependence from the underlying contract between the Buyers
and the Builder. This, however, is not the case, since the inclusion of a reference
to the underlying relationship between the instructing party and the beneficiary is
a typical feature of every guarantee contract that does not aim at creating any
interdependent relationship.9
Garanties op Eerste Verzoek, Bruylant, Brussels 1998, p. 236 (hereinafter abbreviated A. PRÜM,
1998); G. SCHRANS, 1994, p. 1167; J. VAN RYN & J. HEENEN, 1988, p. 520;
E. WYMEERSCH, 1986, p. 484; E. WYMEERSCH, R. STEENNOT & M. TISON, ‘Overzicht van
rechtspraak. Privaat bankrecht (1999–2007)’, TPR 2008, p. 1089 (hereinafter abbreviated E.
WYMEERSCH, R. STEENNOT & M. TISON, 2008).
6 C. BORMS, 2007, p. 87; E. DIRIX & R. DE CORTE, 2006, p. 301; C. MARTIN & M.
DELIERNEUX, 1990, p. 572.
7 E. DIRIX & R. DE CORTE, 2006, pp. 301–302.
8 J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX, 2000, p. 736; E. DIRIX & R. DE CORTE, 2006, p. 302;
J. ROMAIN, ‘Principes d’interprétation et de qualification des garanties indépendantes à
première demande’, TBBR 1989, pp. 430 and 433–437 (hereinafter abbreviated J. ROMAIN,
1989).
9 Brussels 14 Feb. 2000, DAOR 2000, p. 269, note C. LEWALLE; Brussels 26 Apr. 2002, NJW
2003, p. 278, note R. STEENNOT; R.F. BERTRAMS, Bank guarantees in international trade,
Kluwer, Den Haag 1996, p. 79; D. DE MAREZ, 2000–2001, p. 326; J. ROMAIN, 1989,
pp. 444–447; E. WYMEERSCH, 1986, p. 489; E. WYMEERSCH, R. STEENNOT & M. TISON,
2008, p. 1085.
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More in detail, the Bonds can be characterized as a garantie de
remboursement or a garantie de restitution d’acomptes, since in the case at hand,
Article X.8 of the Contracts states that the Builder would deliver to the Buyers
refund guarantees relating to the first and subsequent instalments and because of
the fact that the Bonds are called Advance Payment Bonds. Kookmin Bank indeed
assures repayment of the instalments.
The garantie bancaire à première demande, to be translated as bank
guarantee on first demand or simple demand guarantee,10 is a guarantee contract,
in which a guarantor, mostly a bank, commits himself to the payment of a sum of
money to a beneficiary, on first demand, following the conditions included in the
guarantee contract, while not being allowed to raise objections arising of
obligations outside the letter of guarantee. The guarantee contract often has the
form of a letter, the so-called letter of guarantee. A simple demand guarantee is
supplied as a performance of an underlying agreement between the party who
instructs the guarantee and the beneficiary.
3. The Contracts
In Rainy Sky S.A. and Others v. Kookmin Bank, Lord Clarke reflects upon the
interpretation of the Advance Payment Bonds in the following words: It is
common ground that the terms of the Contracts are relevant to the true
construction of the Bonds. They are referred to in the Bonds and provide the
immediate context in which the Bonds were entered into. They are thus plainly an
important aid to the meaning of the Bonds.
Thus, according to English common law, the underlying contract between
the instructing party and the beneficiary can be a useful tool in interpreting the
Bonds. However, in Belgium, this is not the case at all.
In its most basic form, a bank guarantee on first demand implies the
intervention of three persons: an instructing party, a beneficiary, and a guarantor.
The guarantor, which is in most cases a bank, directly commits himself to pay an
amount of money to the beneficiary. The cause of this commitment, the decisive
motivation,11 is vehemently discussed. First, some scholars consider that the
10 D. DE MAREZ, 2000–2001, p. 323.
11 H. CAPITANT, De la cause des obligations: contracts, engagements unilatéraux, legs, Dalloz,
Paris 1927, p. 23 (hereinafter abbreviated H. CAPITANT, 1927); C. DEHOUCK, Documentair
krediet, die Keure, Bruges 2007, p. 445 (hereinafter abbreviated C. DEHOUCK, 2007);
L. SIMONT, ‘De abstracte verbintenis van de bankier naar Belgisch recht’, TPR 1985, p. 692
(hereinafter abbreviated L. SIMONT, 1985); F. T’KINT & W. DERIJCKE, ‘La Garantie
Indépendante à l’Ombre des Apparences’, in Hommage à J. Heenen, Bruylant, Brussels 1994,
p. 439 (hereinafter abbreviated F. T’KINT & W. DERIJCKE, 1994); W. VAN GERVEN &
S. COVEMAEKER, Verbintenissenrecht, Acco, Louvain 2010, pp. 138–139 (hereinafter
abbreviated W. VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER, 2010); P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, ‘Examen
de jurisprudence. Les obligations (1969–1973)’, RCJB 1975, p. 459 (hereinafter abbreviated
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guarantee commitment results from the relationship between the instructing
party and the beneficiary.12 The guarantor only undertakes to pay the beneficiary
because the beneficiary commits himself towards the instructing party. If no
contract would have existed between the guarantor and the instructing party,
there would be no need whatsoever to establish a guarantee commitment. Besides,
some are of the opinion that the instructing party-beneficiary as well as the
relationship instructing party-guarantor contains the roots of the guarantee
commitment.13 Followers of this view take into account all the different reasons
underlying the decision of the bank to engage in a guarantee commitment.14 They
believe that in both different legal relationships a decisive motivation is to be
found. A last view, with which I agree, grounds the guarantee commitment in the
relationship guarantor-instructing party.15 The decisive motivations for the
guarantor to undertake a commitment are the fact that he receives a commission
and the knowledge that he has a right of recovery. The demand of the instructing
party to establish a guarantee commitment is grounded in the relationship
beneficiary-instructing party, but this is the reason why the instructing party
P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, 1975); P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, Droit des obligations, Bruylant,
Brussels 2010, p. 303 at 306–307 (hereinafter abbreviated P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, 2010).
12 Paris 29 Jan. 1981, D. 1981, 336, note M. VASSEUR; Paris 17 Dec. 1992, D. 1993, Som. 98,
note M. VASSEUR; S. PIEDELIEVRE, 2008, p. 7; P. SIMLER, Caution et garanties autonomes,
Litec, Paris, pp. 850–851; E. WYMEERSCH, R. STEENNOT & M. TISON, 2008, p. 1085.
13 C. Brussels 3 Sep. 1983, TBH 1994, p. 1126; C. BORMS, 2007, p. 81; J. BUYLE &
M. DELIERNEUX, ‘Garantie bancaire à première demande: conditions d’appel, abus,
prorogation et cause’ (note under Comm. C. Brussels 21 Nov. 1997), TBH 1998, p. 859
(hereinafter abbreviated J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX, 1998); C. MARTIN & M.
DELIERNEUX, 1990, p. 563; E. NORDIN, ‘Het abstract, autonoom en letterlijk karakter van de
bankgarantie op eerste verzoek’ (note under Cass. 24 Apr. 2009), RW 2010–2011, p. 1283
(hereinafter abbreviated E. NORDIN, 2010–2011); L. SIMONT, 1985, p. 704; L. SIMONT,
‘Garantie Indépendante ou Cautionnement’, in L’actualité de Garanties à Première Demande –
Actualia inzake Garanties op Eerste Verzoek, Bruylant, Brussels 1998, p. 115 (hereinafter
abbreviated L. SIMONT, 1998); P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, ‘Observations sur la théorie de la cause
dans la jurisprudence et dans la doctrine moderne’ (note under Cass. 13 Nov. 1969), RCJB 1970,
pp. 357 and 362 (hereinafter abbreviated P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, 1970); J. VAN RYN & J.
HEENEN, 1988, p. 520.
14 Cass. 13 Nov. 1953, Pas. 1954, I, p. 190; C. Brussels 3 Sep. 1983, TBH 1994, p. 1126; C.
DEHOUCK, 2007, p. 448; E. NORDIN, 2010–2011, p. 1283; L. SIMONT, 1985, p. 693; P. VAN
OMMESLAGHE, 1970, p. 341; E. WYMEERSCH, 1986, p. 490.
15 Comm. C. Brussels 7 Aug. 1979, Bank. Fin. 1982, p. 99; P. COLLE, ‘Kroniek handels- en
distributieovereenkomsten’, RW 2007–2008, p. 180 (hereinafter abbreviated P. COLLE,
2007–2008); P. COLLE, ‘Actualia Garanties op eerste verzoek’, in Van alle markten. Liber
amicorum Eddy Wymeersch, Intersentia, Antwerpen 2008, p. 227 (hereinafter abbreviated
P. COLLE, 2008); C. DEHOUCK, 2007, pp. 443 and 446; E. DIRIX, Obligatoire verhoudingen
tussen contractanten en derden, Kluwer, Antwerpen 1984, p. 155 at 167–170 (hereinafter
abbreviated E. DIRIX, 1984); E. NORDIN, 2010–2011, p. 1283; F. T’KINT & W. DERIJCKE,
1994, pp. 439–440.
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wants the guarantee commitment to come into being, not the reason why the
guarantor wants this to happen.16
In order for a guarantee commitment to fully fulfil its function as a
security, it is necessary that it can be invoked at any time, independent from what
happens to the other contracts that form part of the triangular relationship.17
However, since the cause of the commitment is to be found in the relationship
instructing party-guarantor, the validity of the guarantee commitment might be
influenced by that legal relationship. In order to avoid this unwanted effect, an
abstract character is bestowed upon the bank guarantee on first demand. By doing
so, the bank guarantee is detached from its cause and, therefore, from the
underlying relationship between the instructing party and the guarantor.18 This
does not mean that there is no cause, which would be contrary to Article 1131
CC, but merely that the validity cannot be affected by means of defence arising
from the contract between the instructing party and the guarantor.19
The Belgian Court of Cassation used to judge that a legal act can only be
abstract, and thus separated from its cause, when the law prescribes it.20
However, different scholars and judges interpreted law in an extensive way,
conceiving abstract commitments as allowed, as long as the law did not expressly
forbid it, and characterized the bank guarantee on first demand repeatedly as
abstract.21 Therefore, it was not surprising that in 2009, the Court of Cassation
explicitly acknowledged this characterization.22
16 P. COLLE, 2008, pp. 227 and 230; E. NORDIN, 2010–2011, p. 1283; F. T’KINT &
W. DERIJCKE, 1994, p. 439.
17 E. NORDIN, 2010–2011, pp. 1283–1284; E. WYMEERSCH, 1986, p. 489.
18 P. COLLE, 2008, p. 228; C. DEHOUCK, 2007, p. 438; L. SIMONT, 1985, p. 692; F. T’KINT &
W. DERIJCKE, 1994, p. 439; W. VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER, 2010, pp. 144–145; P.
VAN OMMESLAGHE, 2010, p. 321; J. VAN RYN & J. HEENEN, 1988, p. 521.
19 Comm. C. Charleroi 8 Sep. 1992, JLMB 1993, p. 892, note J. BUYLE; P. COLLE, 2007–2008, p.
180; P. COLLE, 2008, p. 228; C. DEHOUCK, 2007, pp. 437–438, 443; F. DE LY, ‘Garanties en
standby letters of Credit’, TBH 1986, p. 183 (hereinafter abbreviated F. DE LY, 1986); H. DE
PAGE, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge, II, Bruylant, Brussels 1964, p. 476 (hereinafter
abbreviated H. DE PAGE, 1964); E. DIRIX, 1984, p. 170; E. NORDIN, 2010–2011, p. 1284; L.
SIMONT, 1985, pp. 692–693; W. VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER, 2010, pp. 145–146; J.
VAN RYN & J. HEENEN, 1988, p. 521; A. VERBEKE & D. BLOMMAERT, ‘De
patronaatsverklaring. Een persoonlijke zekerheid met vele gezichten’, DAOR 1994, p. 85
(hereinafter abbreviated A. VERBEKE & D. BLOMMAERT, 1994).
20 Cass. 13 Nov. 1969, Arr. Cass. 1970, p. 261, RCJB 1970, p. 326, note P. VAN OMMESLAGHE;
Cass. 5 Nov. 1976, Arr. Cass. 1977, p. 268, RW 1977–1978, p. 440, note J. THIELEMANS.
21 Comm. C. Brussels 11 Mar. 1981, JCB 1981, p. 361; Brussels 18 Dec. 1981, Rev. banque 1982,
p. 99; JT 1982, p. 358; Brussels 25 Feb. 1982, BRH 1982, p. 349; Antwerpen 13 Oct. 1982,
BRH 1982, p. 642; Comm. C. Brussels 28 Apr. 1983, BRH 1984, p. 57; Comm. C. Brussels 25
Sep. 1987, TBH 1988, p. 808; Brussels 5 Apr. 1990, TBH 1992, p. 82, note; Brussels 26 Jun.
1992, TBH 1994, p. 51, note P. LEFEBVRE; Comm. C. Charleroi 8 Sep. 1992, JLMB 1993, p.
892, note J. BUYLE; C. Brussels 3 Sep. 1993, TBH 1994, p. 1126, note J. BUYLE & X. THUNIS;
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The bank guarantee on first demand is not to be acknowledged as abstract
from the relationship between the beneficiary and the guarantor, since the
decisive cause of the commitment is not to be found in that contract.23 However,
exceptions arising from that agreement cannot be raised either.24 In this regard,
the bank guarantee is only to be characterized as independent or autonomous.25
The foundation of the autonomous character is the same of that of the abstract
character: the relativity of the agreement (Art. 1165 CC).26 When the bank pays
an amount of money to the beneficiary, it fulfils its own obligation and settles its
own debt.27
A simple demand guarantee therefore has to be characterized as abstract,
independent, and autonomous at the same time.28 The first epithet only denotes
Comm. C. Brussels 21 Nov. 1997, TBH 1998, p. 850, note J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX;
Brussels 14 Feb. 2000, DAOR 2000, p. 269, note C. LEWALLE; Rev. not. b. 2000, p. 403; P.I.
Comm. C. Brussels 12 Dec. 2000, TBH 2001, p. 812, note J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX;
Brussels 26 Apr. 2002, NJW 2003, p. 278, note R. STEENNOT; Comm. C. Liège 2 Jul. 2002,
TBH 2004, p. 183, note J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX; Brussels 24 Feb. 2004, JT 2005, p. 68;
C. DEHOUCK, 2007, p. 439; P. DE VROEDE & M. FLAMEE, 1982, p. 378; E. DIRIX, 1984,
pp. 167–170; C. MARTIN & M. DELIERNEUX, 1990, p. 564; L. SIMONT, 1985, pp. 693–694;
W. VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER, 2010, p. 145; P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, 1970, p. 362; P.
VAN OMMESLAGHE, 1986, p. 93; J. VAN RYN & J. HEENEN, 1988, p. 520; A. VERBEKE & D.
BLOMMAERT, 1994, p. 85.
22 Cass. 24 Apr. 2009, Arr. Cass. 2009, p. 1103; RW 2010–2011, p. 1301, note E. NORDIN.
23 E. DIRIX, 1984, p. 161; E. NORDIN, 2010–11, p. 1284; P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, 1970, p. 358.
24 Comm. C. Brussels 25 Sep. 1987, TBH 1988, p. 808; Comm. C. Charleroi 8 Sep. 1992, JLMB
1993, p. 892, note J. BUYLE; Comm. C. Brussels 1 Feb. 1996, TBH 1997, p. 778, note X.; P.I.
Comm. C. Brussels 12 Dec. 2000, TBH 2001, p. 812, note J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX; C.
BORMS, 2007, p. 82; J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX, 2000, p. 738; P. COLLE, 2007–2008, p.
179; P. COLLE, 2008, p. 227, 230; C. DEHOUCK, 2007, p. 444; F. DE LY, 1986, p. 172; C.
CAUFFMAN, ‘Enige bedenkingen bij de bankgarantie op eerste verzoek’ (note under Mons 8
Apr. 2002), TBBR 2004, p. 342 (hereinafter abbreviated C. CAUFFMAN, 2004); E. DIRIX,
1984, p. 160; C. MARTIN & M. DELIERNEUX, 1990, p. 567; G. SCHRANS, 1994, p. 1167; W.
VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER, 2010, p. 146; P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, 1970, p. 362; P.
VAN OMMESLAGHE, 2010, p. 334; A. VERBEKE & D. BLOMMAERT, 1994, p. 85; E.
WYMEERSCH, R. STEENNOT & M. TISON, 2008, p. 1087.
25 E. NORDIN, 2010–2011, pp. 1284–1285; F. T’KINT & W. DERIJCKE, 1994, pp. 431–434.
26 C. BORMS, 2007, p. 82; C. DEHOUCK, 2007, p. 444; F. DE LY, 1986, p. 183; E. DIRIX, 1984,
p. 1; E. NORDIN, 2010–2011, p. 1284.
27 C. DEHOUCK, 2007, pp. 446–447.
28 Comm. C. Brussels 25 Oct. 1987, TBH 1988, p. 808; Brussels 5 Apr. 1990, TBH 1992, p. 82,
note; Brussels 26 Jun. 1992, TBH 1994, p. 51, note P. LEFEBVRE; Comm. C. Charleroi 8 Sep.
1992, JLMB 1993, p. 892, note J. BUYLE; Comm. C. Namur 12 Sep. 1994, JLMB 1995, p. 801,
note X. FOSSOUL; TBH 1995, p. 67; Comm. C. Brussels 5 Feb. 1996, RW 1996–1997, p. 1263;
Brussels 14 Feb. 2000, DAOR 2000, p. 269, note C. LEWALLE; Rev. not. b. 2000, p. 403; P.I.
Comm. C. Brussels 12 Dec. 2000, TBH 2001, p. 812, note J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX;
Brussels 26 Apr. 2002, NJW 2003, p. 278, note R. STEENNOT; Comm. C. Liège 2 Jul. 2002,
TBH 2004, p. 183, note J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX; Brussels 24 Feb. 2004, JT 2005, p. 68;
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the independency of the relationship bank-beneficiary from the contract between
the bank and the instructing party, whereas the two last epithets refer to the
independency in relation to both underlying contracts, namely the agreement
between the guarantor and the instructing party as well as the contract concluded
between the beneficiary and the instructing party. No exceptions arising from the
relationship guarantor-beneficiary nor from the relationship beneficiary-issuer of
the guarantee therefore can influence the guarantee commitment.29
The autonomous and abstract character of the bank guarantee gives rise to
literalism: the content, scope, extent, and limits of the guarantor’s obligations are
exclusively determined by the guarantee contract or letter of guarantee itself.30
Comm. C. Louvain 18 May 2004, TBH 2006, p. 106; Antwerpen 6 Dec. 2006, RW 2008–2009,
p. 370; err. RW 2008–2009, p. 471; Gent 3 Dec. 2007, TBBR 2010, p. 148; P. COLLE,
2007–2008, pp. 180–181; E. NORDIN, 2010–2011, pp. 1283–1285; H. VAN LIER, ‘Les
garanties dites “à première demande” ou abstraites’, JT 1980, pp. 345–357.
29 Brussels 17 Nov. 1988, Pas. 1989, II, 113; Comm. C. Brussels 21 Nov. 1997, TBH 1998, p. 850,
note J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX; Comm. C. Ghent 16 Nov. 1999, TBH 2001, p. 809; Gent 3
Dec. 2007, TBBR 2010, p. 148; C. BORMS, 2007, p. 84; P. COLLE, 2007–2008, p. 180; P.
COLLE, 2008, p. 230; D. DE MAREZ, 2000, pp. 309–310; D. DE MAREZ, 2000–2001, p. 321;
P. DE VROEDE & M. FLAMEE, 1982, p. 371; E. NORDIN, 2010–2011, pp. 1284–1285; L.
SIMONT, 1985, p. 704; P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, 2010, p. 334; A. VERBEKE & A.
BLOMMAERT, Patronaatsverklaringen, Kluwer, Antwerpen 1996, p. 42.
30 Brussels 5 Apr. 1990, TBH 1992, p. 82, note; Brussels 26 Jun. 1992, TBH 1994, p. 51, note P.
LEFEBVRE; Comm. C. Charleroi 8 Sep. 1992, JLMB 1993, p. 892, note J. BUYLE; Comm. C.
Brussels 15 Dec. 1992, TBH 1993, p. 1055, note J. BUYLE & X. THUNIS; Comm. C. Namur 12
Sep. 1994, JLMB 1995, p. 801, note X. FOSSOUL; TBH 1995, p. 67; Comm. C. Turnhout 30
Oct. 1995, RW 1996–1997, p. 328; Comm. C. Brussels 5 Feb. 1996, RW 1996–1997, p. 1263;
Comm. C. Brussels 21 Nov. 1997, TBH 1998, p. 850, note J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX; Liège
24 Sep. 1999, DAOR 1999, p. 206; JLMB 2000, p. 1693; TBH 2000, p. 734, note J. BUYLE &
M. DELIERNEUX; Brussels 14 Feb. 2000, DAOR 2000, p. 269, note C. LEWALLE; Rev. not. b.
2000, p. 403; Brussels 2 Mar. 2001, RDCB 2002, p. 484, note W. DERIJCKE; Comm. C.
Brussels 11 Dec. 2001, TBH 2003, p. 57, note J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX; Brussels 26 Apr.
2002, NJW 2003, p. 278, note R. STEENNOT; Brussels 24 Feb. 2004, JT 2005, p. 68; Comm. C.
Leuven 18 May 2004, TBH 2006, p. 106; Antwerpen 6 Dec. 2006, RW 2008–2009, p. 370; err.
RW 2008–2009, p. 471; Cass. 24 Apr. 2009, Arr. Cass. 2009, p. 1103; RW 2010–2011, p. 1301,
note E. NORDIN; Brussels 28 May 2009, JLMB 2009, p. 1867; NJW 2010, p. 325, note R.
STEENNOT; C. BORMS, 2007, p. 84; G. BOSMAN, loose-leaf, IV.115-4–IV.115-5; P. COLLE,
2007–2008, p. 181; M. DELIERNEUX, ‘Les garanties indépendantes, quinze ans de
jurisprudence et de doctrine (de 1989 à 2003)’, Bank. Fin. R. 2003, pp. 348–349 (hereinafter
abbreviated M. DELIERNEUX, 2003); D. DE MAREZ, 2000, p. 308; D. DE MAREZ, 2000–2001,
p. 321; C. MARTIN & M. DELIERNEUX, 1990, p. 565; W. DERIJCKE, ‘Een zonneklare
toepassing van de leer inzake garanties op eerste verzoek’ (note under Brussels 2 Mar. 2001),
RDCB 2002, p. 493; E. NORDIN, 2010–2011, p. 1287; Y. POULLET, ‘Les Garanties
Autonomes: les Exceptions au Devoir de Paiement’, in L’actualité de Garanties à Première
Demande – Actualia inzake Garanties op Eerste Verzoek, Bruylant, Brussels 1998, pp. 129–130
(hereinafter abbreviated Y. POULLET, 1998); G. SCHRANS, 1994, p. 1167; L. SIMONT, 1998,
p. 112; F. T’KINT & W. DERIJCKE, 1994, p. 435; J. VAN RYN & J. HEENEN, 1988, p. 521.
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Besides, he cannot rely on other exceptions than the ones that arise from the
words of the guarantee letter, in which his intention is expressed and the limits of
his commitment are included.31 This very formal approach is the guiding
interpretation principle in the field of bank guarantees, which results in a very
limited interpretation power of any interpreter, whether it is the guarantor
himself, a judge, or an arbiter.32 The immediate effect of literalism is that every
request made by the beneficiary to perform the guarantee needs to be formally
examined for compatibility with the terms of the guarantee contract.33 If the
beneficiary demands performance of the guarantee, the guarantor only needs to
check whether or not the formal conditions and the provisions as regards content
are fulfilled.34 The literalist character and its main consequence, namely the
formal review of the beneficiary’s request, are indicated with the term guarantee
formalism.35
The literal character is sometimes under discussion when a more flexible
approach is pleaded for, since literalism can lead to unreasonable results in some
cases.36 In a French case, the parties had agreed that an arbitral reward had to be
submitted in order to be able to call upon the guarantee. However, the judge
accepted a judgment rendered by a judge and not by an arbiter as a fulfilment of
this condition.37 The Court of Cassation yet quashed the decision as a violation of
Article 1134 CC.38 In the Netherlands, the Hoge Raad took a more flexible
approach considering that reasonableness needed to play a role in the
interpretation of a bank guarantee.39
31 Cass. 24 Apr. 2009, Arr. Cass. 2009, p. 1103; RW 2010–2011, p. 1301, note E. NORDIN; C.
BORMS, 2007, p. 77; P. COLLE, 2007–2008, pp. 180–181; C. MARTIN & M. DELIERNEUX,
1990, p. 565, 584.
32 D. DE MAREZ, 2000, pp. 308–309.
33 Cass. 24 Apr. 2009, Arr. Cass. 2009, p. 1103; RW 2010–2011, p. 1301, note E. NORDIN; C.
BORMS, 2007, p. 79, pp. 84–85; D. DE MAREZ, 2000, p. 308; D. DE MAREZ, 2000–2001, p.
321; C. MARTIN & M. DELIERNEUX, 1990, pp. 566–567.
34 Comm. C. Namur 12 Sep. 1994, JLMB 1995, p. 801, note X. FOSSOUL; TBH 1995, p. 67;
Antwerpen 5 May 2010, RHA 2010, p. 64; Cass. 24 Apr. 2009, Arr. Cass. 2009, p. 1103; RW
2010–2011, p. 1301, note E. NORDIN; C. BORMS, 2007, p. 77, pp. 84–85; C. CAUFFMAN,
2004, p. 342; D. DE MAREZ, 2000, p. 310; D. DE MAREZ, 2000–2001, p. 322; F. T’KINT & W.
DERIJCKE, 1994, pp. 452–453.
35 Comm. C. Leuven 18 May 2004, TBH 2006, p. 106; Antwerpen 6 Dec. 2006, RW 2008–2009, p.
370; err. RW 2008–2009, p. 471; Gent 3 Dec. 2007, TBBR 2010, p. 148; C. BORMS, 2007, p.
77, 84; J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX, 2000, p. 738; P. COLLE, 2008, p. 232; D. DE MAREZ,
2000, p. 308; D. DE MAREZ, 2000–2001, p. 321; C. MARTIN & M. DELIERNEUX, 1990, pp.
566–567; E. WYMEERSCH, R. STEENNOT & M. TISON, 2008, p. 1093.
36 M. DELIERNEUX, 2003, p. 348; E. NORDIN, 2010–2011, p. 1288.
37 Paris 17 Dec. 1991, D. S. 1992, p. 240, note M. VASSEUR.
38 Cass. fr. 7 Feb. 1995, RJDA 1995/6, 600.
39 H.R. 26 Mar. 2004, C02/266HR, www.rechtspraak.nl.
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The guarantee stated that the beneficiary could only rely on the guarantee
after the submission of a mandatory opinion issued by M., an expertise centre,
that made it clear that the issuer of the guarantee had failed to fulfil his
obligations. However, because of a conflict of interest, the bureau did not want to
be involved, unless the instructing party declared that it could operate. Yet, the
instructing party refused to agree. The Hoge Raad decided that a literal
interpretation of the guarantee would be unfair, regarding the circumstances and
the behaviour of the issuer of the guarantee.
In Belgium, case law and legal doctrine in general vehemently stick to the
principle of literalism.40 This holds equally for procedural requirements, for
instance, the condition that a demand to perform the guarantee should be made
by registered letter, as for requirements as to the content of the demand to
perform, such as the need for specific statements of the presentation of specified
documents. In both cases, any appeal that does not comply with the conditions is
void and has to be rejected.41 After all, the inclusion of requirements is a
deliberate choice, to which the beneficiary could have objected at the time of the
conclusion of the letter of guarantee.
In a recent case, the Court of Appeal of Brussels repeated that a bank
guarantee must be interpreted in a literal way.42 By way of a repayment
guarantee, a bank had committed itself to refund an advance payment that
amounted to a sum of EUR 186,000. The letter of guarantee stated that it would
take effect once a deposit of EUR 186,000 would have been made on the account
of the beneficiary of the guarantee. Due to tax legislation 5 per cent of the total
sum was withheld, so that only EUR 176,700 was deposited. When the beneficiary
40 Brussels 5 Apr. 1990, TBH 1992, p. 82, note; Brussels 26 Jun. 1992, TBH 1994, p. 51, note P.
LEFEBVRE; Comm. C. Brussels 15 Dec. 1992, TBH 1993, p. 1055, note J. BUYLE & X.
THUNIS; Comm. C. Namur 12 Sep. 1994, JLMB 1995, 801, note X. FOSSOUL; TBH 1995, p.
67; Comm. C. Turnhout 30 Oct. 1995, RW 1996–1997, p. 328; Comm. C. Brussels 5 Feb. 1996,
RW 1996–1997, p. 1263; Comm. C. Brussels 21 Nov. 1997, TBH 1998, p. 850, note J. BUYLE &
M. DELIERNEUX; Liège 24 Sep. 1999, DAOR 1999, p. 206; JLMB 2000, p. 1693; TBH 2000,
p. 734, note J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX; Brussels 14 Feb. 2000, DAOR 2000, p. 269, note C.
LEWALLE; Rev. not. b. 2000, p. 403; Comm. C. Brussels 11 Dec. 2001, TBH 2003, p. 57, note
J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX; Brussels 26 Apr. 2002, NJW 2003, p. 278, note R. STEENNOT;
Brussels 24 Feb. 2004, JT 2005, p. 68; Comm. C. Leuven 18 May 2004, TBH 2006, p. 106;
Antwerpen 6 Dec. 2006, RW 2008–2009, p. 370; err. RW 2008–2009, p. 471; Cass. 24 Apr.
2009, Arr. Cass. 2009, p. 1103; RW 2010–2011, p. 1301, note E. NORDIN; Brussels 28 May
2009, JLMB 2009, p. 1867; NJW 2010, p. 325, note R. STEENNOT; C. BORMS, 2007, p. 84; C.
CAUFFMAN, 2004, p. 342; P. COLLE, 2007–2008, p. 181; P. COLLE, 2008, p. 232; D. DE
MAREZ, 2000–2001, pp. 308 and 324; C. MARTIN & M. DELIERNEUX, 1990, p. 567; Y.
POULLET, 1998, p. 130; E. WYMEERSCH, R. STEENNOT & M. TISON, 2008, p. 1090.
41 D. DE MAREZ, 2000, pp. 324–328.
42 Brussels 28 May 2009, JLMB 2009, p. 1867; NJW 2010, p. 325, note R. STEENNOT. See, for a
similar case, Comm. C. Brussels 5 Feb. 1996, RW 1996–1997, p. 1263.
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demanded repayment of EUR 176,700, the bank refused, stating that the
guarantee had never taken effect. The Court of Appeal followed this reasoning
and judged that the guarantee had not entered into force, because no advance
payment of EUR 186,000 had been deposited.
In an older case, the Court of Appeal of Brussels explicitly judged that the
taking effect and the scope of a letter of guarantee are not dependent upon the
intention of the parties.43
The Court of Appeal of Brussels emphasized the abstract and literal
character of the bank guarantee. In the case, a provision of a repayment
guarantee stated:
This contract provides for an advance payment of 30%, i.e. DEM 140.220,-
against a bank guarantee of DEM 140.220,-. We, GENERALE DE BANQUE-
GENERALE BANK, Régional Office of BRUSSELS, therefore guarantee […]
irrevocably and unconditionally the payment of an amount of DEM 140.220,-
[…] maximum. We shall pay you this amount upon your first demand without
regard to the merits of your demand. This guarantee will enter into force when
the above mentioned advance payment is effectively credited to account n° […]
opened in the name of S.A. FUSION with our bank. […] If no demand is made
in accordance with the above mentioned conditions […], this guarantee will
automatically expire on June 30th, 1990.
However, only EUR 62,888.90 (123,000 DM) was deposited. When the
beneficiary demanded repayment of EUR 62,888.90 (123,000 DM), the bank
refused, stating that the guarantee had never taken effect. The Court of Appeal
followed this reasoning and judged that the guarantee had not entered into force,
because no advance payment of EUR 71,693.35 (DM 140,220) had been
deposited.
One exception to the principle of literalism can be found in a judgment
from the Court of Appeal of Liège, where it judged that the guarantee formalism
does not free the guarantor from the obligation to perform his obligation in good
faith.44 However, not everyone approves of the judgment.45
The guarantor, a bank, had accepted three different extend or pay
demands, even when they did not live up to the formal conditions prescribed by
the guarantee contract. When the bank suddenly declined a fourth extend or pay
demand on the ground that it did not comply with the requirements, the Court
considered this a breach of good faith. The Court first acknowledged the literal
43 Brussels 26 Apr. 2002, NJW 2003, p. 278, note R. STEENNOT.
44 Liège 24 Sep. 1999, TBH 2000, p. 734.
45 J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX, 2000, pp. 738–739 ; D. DE MAREZ, 2000, pp. 304–344.
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character of the guarantee, stating that the conditions that are mentioned need to
be interpreted in a strict way. However, the Court adds that the guarantor cannot
invoke formal deficiencies, when doing so would be inconsistent with la loyauté et
confiance réciproques en correlation avec les usages admis en affaires.
It implies that a Belgian judge who would have to render a judgment in
similar circumstances as the facts underlying in the case Rainy Sky S.A. and
Others v. Kookmin Bank, unlike an English judge, would not use the terms of the
underlying contracts between the Builder and the Buyers in order to interpret the
Bonds. In Belgium, the terms of the contracts are not relevant to the true
construction of the Bonds. Even if they are referred to in the Bonds and even if
they provide the immediate context in which the Bonds were entered into, they
cannot be an important aid to the meaning of the Bonds, because of the abstract,
autonomous, and literal character of the bank guarantee on first demand.
However, since the text of the Bonds is ambiguous, a literal interpretation cannot
be carried out. The general rules of interpretation therefore need to be called
upon.46
4. The Correct Approach to Construction
As to describing the correct approach to construction in Rainy Sky S.A. and
Others v. Kookmin Bank, Lord Clarke proceeds in two steps. First, he mentions
the general English approach to construction, stating the principles of
interpretation applicable in the case of any contract:
I agree with Lord Neuberger that those cases show that the ultimate aim of
interpreting a provision in a contract, especially a commercial contract, is to
determine what the parties meant by the language used, which involves
ascertaining what a reasonable person would have understood the parties to
have meant. As Lord Hoffmann made clear in the first of the principles he
summarized in the Investors Compensation Scheme case at page 912H, the
relevant reasonable person is one who has all the background knowledge which
would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which
they were at the time of the contract.
He then adds that more specific in the case at hand, the issue between the parties
[…] is the role to be played by considerations of business common sense in
determining what the parties meant. After quoting a significant body of authority,
Lord Clarke concludes: Where a term of a contract is open to more than one
interpretation, it is generally appropriate to adopt the interpretation which is most
consistent with business common sense.
46 J. ROMAIN, 1989, pp. 430 and 432, footnote 10.
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Looking at the case at hand from a Belgian perspective, two questions need
to be asked: (1) what is the Belgian approach towards interpretation? And (2)
does business common sense play a role in Belgian interpretation?
5. The Belgian Approach towards Interpretation
5.1. Introduction
Lord Clarke refers to the objective approach to contractual interpretation, which
is typical for English common law.47 A judge does not aim at finding out what the
parties meant when they entered into the agreement, but rather at an objective
understanding of the meaning reasonable persons acting under the same
circumstances would bestow upon the contract. After all, parties should be free to
act upon the intention of the other party that is expressed, without having to take
into account subjective intentions.48 In addition, third parties should be able to
rely on the words of an agreement with a reasonable degree of certainty.49
In this part, we investigate the Belgian approach towards contractual
interpretation. In Belgium, a subjective approach governs. The main criterion
that plays a role in interpretation is the common intention of the contracting
parties. However, there is a growing body of opinion that stresses the need for a
more objective viewpoint.
5.2. Subjective Approach
5.2.1. Hierarchy of the Interpretation Rules
The most fundamental rule of interpretation is contained in Article 1156 CC,
stating: One must in agreements seek what the common intention of the contracting
parties was, rather than pay attention to the literal meaning of the terms.50 Since
47 K. LEWISON, The Interpretation of Contracts, Sweet and Maxwell, London 2007, pp. 21–29
(hereinafter abbreviated K. LEWISON, 2007); G. MCMEEL, The Construction of Contracts:
Interpretation, Implication, and Rectification, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, p. 25
(hereinafter abbreviated G. MCMEEL, 2011).
48 G. MCMEEL, 2011, p. 25.
49 K. LEWISON, 2007, p. 23.
50 A. DE BOECK, ‘Uitlegging’, in Bijzondere overeenkomsten. Artikelsgewijze commentaar met
overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer. Verbintenissenrecht, Titel II. Contractenrecht, Kluwer,
Antwerpen 2010, pp. 12–13 (hereinafter abbreviated A. DE BOECK, 2010); A. DE BOECK &
M. VAN HOECKE, ‘The Interpretation of Standard Clauses in European Contract Law’, in
H. Collins (ed.), Standard Contract Terms in Europe: A Basis for and a Challenge to European
Contract Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rĳn 2008, p. 215 (hereinafter
abbreviated A. DE BOECK & M. VAN HOECKE, 2008); W. DE BONDT, ‘Uitlegging van
overeenkomsten naar de geest: mogelijkheden, grenzen en alternatieven’, RW 1996–1997,
p. 1002 (hereinafter abbreviated W. DE BONDT, RW 1996–1997); B. DE CONINCK, ‘Le droit
commun de l’interprétation des contrats’, DAOR 2001, p. 40 (hereinafter abbreviated B. DE
CONINCK, 2001); R. KRUITHOF, H. BOCKEN, F. DE LY & B. DE TEMMERMAN, ‘Overzicht
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it is not always possible to discover the common intention, Article 1156 is
followed by guidelines on how to ascertain the hypothetical intention, the ideal
will, of the parties on the basis of objective elements.51 Those rules are subsidiary
to the fundamental rule of Article 1156 CC.52
For instance, the Court of Cassation judged that Article 1157 CC does not
mean that a provision always must be interpreted in a sense in which it may have
effect. In this judgment, the Court emphasized the word rather in the text of
Article 1157 CC, taking into account that on the basis of Article 1156 CC there
can be reasons why the judge gives priority to an interpretation because of which
the provision may not produce any effect.53
One rule, namely Article 1162 CC, lacks any kind of familiarity with an
intention whatsoever. Article 1162 CC occupies the lowest place in the hierarchy,
since the Court of Cassation has repeatedly stated that only in the case of
persistent doubt as to the content of the agreement, which means when it is not
possible to find out the common intention of the parties on the basis of intrinsic
or extrinsic elements, Article 1162 CC comes into play.54
van rechtspraak (1981–1992)’, TPR 1994, p. 445 (hereinafter abbreviated R. KRUITHOF,
H. BOCKEN, F. DE LY & B. DE TEMMERMAN, 1994); D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS &
N. PEETERS, ‘Afdeling 3. Uitlegging en implementatie van overeenkomsten’, in J. Roodhooft
(ed.), Bestendig Handboek Verbintenissenrecht, Kluwer, Mechelen, loose-leaf, II.4-126
(hereinafter abbreviated D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf); A. VAN
OEVELEN, ‘Noot – De interpretatie de goeder trouw van overeenkomsten en de toepassing ervan
op de omzetting van een hypothecaire volmacht’, RW 2006–2007, p. 875 (hereinafter
abbreviated A. VAN OEVELEN, 2006–2007); F. VERMANDER, ‘De interpretatie en aanvulling
van een overeenkomst naar Belgisch recht’, in J. Smits, J. & S. Stijns (eds), Inhoud en werking
van de overeenkomst naar Belgisch en Nederlands recht, Intersentia, Antwerpen 2005, p. 22
(hereinafter abbreviated F. VERMANDER, 2005).
51 See A. GUILMOT & Y. NINANE, ‘L’interprétation du contrat’, in Obligations. Traité théorique et
pratique, Kluwer, Brussels, loose-leaf, II.1.5-13 (hereinafter abbreviated A. GUILMOT & Y.
NINANE, loose-leaf); R. KRUITHOF, H. BOCKEN, F. DE LY & B. DE TEMMERMAN, 1994, p.
449.
52 A. DE BOECK & M. VAN HOECKE, 2008, p. 215; A. GUILMOT & Y. NINANE, loose-leaf,
II.1.5-13; R. KRUITHOF, H. BOCKEN, F. DE LY & B. DE TEMMERMAN, 1994, p. 449.
53 Cass. 25 Sep. 1981, RW 1982–1983, p. 433.
54 Cass. 23 Dec. 1966, Arr. Cass. 1967, p. 526; Pas. 1967, I, p. 522; Cass. 23 Jun. 1983, Arr. Cass.
1982–1983, p. 1311; Bull. 1983, p. 1196; JT 1983, p. 521; Pas. 1983, I, p. 1196; Cass. 28 Oct.
1983, Arr. Cass. 1983–1984, p. 245; Bull. 1984, p. 228; Pas. 1984, I, p. 228; RW 1983–1984, p.
1078; Cass. 17 Oct. 1988, Arr. Cass. 1988–1989, p. 175; Bull. 1989, p. 158; JT 1989, p. 196;
JTT 1989, p. 156; Pas. 1989, I, p. 158; Cass. 22 Feb. 2002, Arr. Cass. 2002, II, p. 570; Pas.
2002, II, p. 531. See also Brussels 2 Mar. 1965, Rec. gén. enr. not. 1965, p. 284 and Antwerpen
23 Jan. 1986, RW 1989–1987, p. 324, note C. PAUWELS.
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5.2.2. Main Rule: Common Intention of the Parties
5.2.2.1. Article 1156 CC
One must, in agreement, seek what the common intention of the contracting
parties was, rather than pay attention to the literal meaning of the terms.
Consistent with Article 1156 CC, one must seek in contracts what the
common intention of the parties is, rather than pay attention to the literal meaning
of the terms. The common intention of the parties is their initial will, namely the
intention they shared at the time of the conclusion of the agreement.55 This basic
interpretation rule is in line with the primacy of the intention in the Belgian Civil
Code.
How to discover the common intention of the parties that existed at the
time of the conclusion of the agreement? First, the judge can rely on the words
used in the agreement, assuming they are an externalization of the common
intention of the parties wanted.56 Not only the clause under investigation can be
used but also the other terms and clauses of the same contract as well.57 Often
however, the written terms do not suffice in order to discover the true intention.
In that case, it is permitted to include extrinsic elements in the activity of
interpretation.58 These are elements that are outside the instrumentum of the
agreement and can be drawn from the whole context of the contract, such as the
performance of the agreement, correspondence between the parties,
precontractual documents, the performance of other contracts between the
parties, the purpose of the contract, statements of the parties, the principal
agreement (for the interpretation of additional contracts), presumptions, the
personality of the parties, and so on.59
55 L. CORNELIS, Algemene theorie van de verbintenis, Intersentia, Antwerpen 2000, p. 274
(hereinafter abbreviated L. CORNELIS, 2000, p. 274); A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 13.
56 A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 8; W. DE BONDT, 1996–1997, pp. 1002 and 1004; B. DE CONINCK,
2001, p. 40; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-127; F. VERMANDER,
2005, pp. 24–25.
57 Cass. 10 Nov. 1960, Pas. 1961, I, p. 267; Res Jur. Imm. 1960, p. 437; Cass. 9 Oct. 1964, Pas.
1965, I, p. 134; Cass. 25 Mar. 1965, Pas. 1965, I, p. 788; Cass. 13 May 1966, Pas. 1966, I, p.
1158; F. VERMANDER, 2005, p. 25.
58 L. CORNELIS, 2000, pp. 274–575; A. DE BOECK, 2010, pp. 14–15; A. DE BOECK & M. VAN
HOECKE, 2008, p. 215; W. DE BONDT, 1996–1997, p. 1002; B. DE CONINCK, 2001, p. 40; I.
DEMUYNCK, ‘Interpretatie van verzekeringsovereenkomsten’, DCCR 2002, p. 71 (hereinafter
abbreviated I. DEMUYNCK, 2002); H. DE PAGE, 1964, p. 553; A. GUILMOT & Y. NINANE,
loose-leaf, II.1.5-7; R. KRUITHOF, H. BOCKEN, F. DE LY & B. DE TEMMERMAN, 1994, p.
447; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-127; A. VAN OEVELEN,
2006–2007, p. 875; W. VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER, 2010, pp. 96–97.
59 Cass. 17 Nov. 1932, Pas. 1933, I, p. 9; Cass. 24 Feb. 1938, Pas. 1938, I, p. 66; Brussels 10 Jul.
1952, JT 1953, p. 185; Cass. 18 Feb. 1954, Arr. Cass. 1954, p. 431; T. JoP. C. 1955, p. 246; JT
1954, p. 501; Pas. 1954, I, p. 545; Cass. 10 Jun. 1958, Arr. Cass. 1958, p. 816; Pas. 1958, I, p.
1142, note W.G.; Rev. prat. soc. 1959, p. 49, note P.D.; Cass. 10 Nov. 1960, Pas. 1961, I, p.
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5.2.2.2. Limits to the Subjective Interpretation Principle
Traditionally, in Belgium, the doctrine of the acte claire prevailed, in line with the
rule from the Digests cum in verbis nulla ambiguitas est, non debet admitti
voluntatis quaestio,60 meaning that clear terms cannot be interpreted.61 However,
267; Res Jur. Imm. 1960, p. 437; Comm. C. Brussels 1 Feb. 1961, Jur. Comm. Brux. 1961, p.
226; Cass. 25 May 1961, Pas. 1961, I, p. 1020; C. Antwerpen 30 Jun. 1961, RW 1964–1965, p.
929; Cass. 16 Oct. 1962, Pas. 1963, I, p. 212; Cass. 29 Nov. 1962, Pas. 1963, I, p. 405; Cass. 21
Feb. 1963, Pas. 1963, I, p. 690; Cass. 9 Oct. 1964, Pas. 1965, I, p. 134; Cass. 3 Jun. 1965, Pas.
1965, I, p. 1074; Cass. 8 Oct. 1965, Pas. 1966, I, p. 181; Cass. 31 Mar. 1966, Pas. 1966, I, p.
995; Cass. 13 May 1966, Pas. 1966, I, p. 1158; Cass. 24 Nov. 1966, Arr. Cass. 1967, p. 402;
Pas. 1967, I, p. 389; Comm. C. Brussels 9 Apr. 1968, BRH 1968, p. 743; Brussels 25 Feb. 1970,
Pas. 1970, II, p. 116; Rev. prat. not. b. 1972, p. 82; Cass. 17 Nov. 1962; Pas. 1963, I, p. 344; C.
Brussels 26 Dec. 1968, Pas. 1970, III, p. 34; Rec. gén. enr. not. 1971, p. 309; Rev. not. b. 1971,
p. 400, note P.M.; Cass. 21 Nov. 1975, Arr. Cass. 1976, p. 375; Pas. 1976, I, p. 371; Cass. 28
Jan. 1976, Arr. Cass. 1976, p. 623; Pas. 1976, I, p. 599; Mons 6 Apr. 1976, JT 1976, p. 425;
Pas. 1977, II, p. 71; Brussels 18 May 1976, JT 1979, p. 220, note P. RIGAUX & P. ROCHE;
Comm. C. Antwerpen 11 oktober 1977, De Verz. 1979, p. 485, note G. VAN DEN BRANDE;
Cass. 10 Nov. 1977, Arr. Cass. 1978, p. 305; Pas. 1978, I, p. 292; Cass. 2 Apr. 1979, Arr. Cass.
1978–1979, p. 908; Pas. 1979, I, p. 908; RW 1979–1980, p. 2112; Cass. 1 Mar. 1984, Arr. Cass.
1983–1984, p. 831; Bull. 1984, p. 764; Pas. 1984, I, p. 764; Cass. 12 Jun. 1986, Arr. Cass.
1985–1986, p. 1394; Bull. 1986, p. 1254; Pas. 1986, I, p. 1254; RW 1986–1987, p. 1146;
Brussels 13 May 1987, JT 1987, p. 613; Mons 20 Jan. 1988, JL 1988, p. 323; Brussels 13 Apr.
1989, JT 1990, p. 327; RW 1989–1990, p. 195; C. Brussels 13 Feb. 1997, Rev. not. b. 2000, p.
415; Cass. 6 Oct. 1997, Arr. Cass. 1997, p. 940; Bull. 1997, p. 986; Pas. 1997, I, p. 986;
Brussels 18 Feb. 1999; AJT 1999–2000, p. 526; C. Bruges 5 Feb. 1999, TBBR 2001, p. 111;
TWVR 1999, p. 56; Brussels 14 Feb. 2000, RGAR 2001, nr. 13.423; RGAR 2001, nr. 13.464;
JoP. C. Westerlo 1 Sep. 2000, RW 2002–2003, p. 513; T. Not. 2002, p. 570; Brugge 19 Dec.
2002, Res Jur. Imm. 2003, p. 138; C. Brussels 15 Apr. 2008, Rev. not. b. 2009, p. 377; C. Liège
1 Apr. 2011, JLMB 2011, p. 920; E. CAUSIN, ‘L’interprétation des contrats en droit belge’, in
L’interprétation en droit. Approche pluridisciplinaire, Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, Brussels
1978, pp. 303–305 (hereinafter abbreviated E. CAUSIN, 1978); L. CORNELIS, 2000, pp.
274–575; A. DE BOECK, 2010, pp. 14–15; W. DE BONDT, 1996–1997, pp. 1002 and 1004; B.
DE CONINCK, 2001, p. 40; B. DELCOURT, ‘La Convention-Loi’, in Obligations. Traité
théorique et pratique, Kluwer, Brussels, loose-leaf, II.1.3-113 (hereinafter abbreviated B.
DELCOURT, loose-leaf); I. DEMUYNCK, 2002, p. 71; H. DE PAGE, pp. 553 and 558; R.
KRUITHOF, H. BOCKEN, F. DE LY & B. DE TEMMERMAN, 1994, p. 447; D. LEJEUNE, K.
SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-127; A. VAN OEVELEN, 2006–2007, p. 875; F.
VERMANDER, 2005, pp. 25–26.
60 ‘When there is no ambiguity in the terms, the question as to the intention does not need to be
asked’.
61 Cass. 18 Jul. 1895, Pas. 1895, I, 257; Cass. 3 Feb. 1950, Arr. Cass. 1950, p. 355; Pas. 1950, I,
p. 380; RW 1949–1950, p. 1321; Cass. 12 May 1966, JT 1967, p. 43; Pas. 1966, I, p. 1137;
RGAR 1967; A. DE BOECK & M. VAN HOECKE, 2008, p. 219; E. CAUSIN, 1978, pp. 285–288;
L. CORNELIS, 2000, p. 261; A. DE BOECK, 2010, pp. 9–10; I. DEMUYNCK, 2002, p. 69; H.
DE PAGE, p. 557; F. DUMON, ‘De motivering van de vonnissen en arresten en de bewijskracht
van de akten’, RW 1978–1979, pp. 297–301 (hereinafter abbreviated F. DUMON, 1978–1979);
D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-120; M.E. STORME, De invloed van
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nowadays, this theory is untenable.62 After all, the determination whether or not a
text is clear is subjective and always depends on an interpretation of the terms.63
Another important limit to interpretation can be indicated. The Belgian
Court of Cassation judged that, according to the rules of evidence (Arts 1319,
1320, and 1322 CC), the meaning bestowed upon a contract by way of
interpretation has to be compatible with its terms. For non-commercial contracts
above EUR 375, Belgian law requires written evidence (Art. 1341 CC). Such a
written act is conclusive evidence of the agreement it contains, which means that
the judge is obliged to accept it as sufficient evidence (Arts 1319 and 1322 CC).64
The power of the judge, who has the sovereign authority to interpret agreements,
is limited in the sense that he is not allowed to deny the evidential value of the
written act, which means he cannot assign a meaning to the act that is conflicting
with its terms.65 The evidential value of the act therefore is the ultimate limit to
de goede trouw op de contractuele schuldvorderingen, Story-Scientia, Brussels 1990, p. 100
(hereinafter abbreviated M.E. STORME, 1990).
62 L. CORNELIS, 2000, p. 261; A. DE BOECK, 2010, pp. 9–10; A. DE BOECK & M. VAN
HOECKE, 2008, p. 219; B. DE CONINCK, 2001, p. 41; I. DEMUYNCK, 2002, p. 70; H. DE
PAGE, 1964, p. 557; F. DUMON, 1978–1979, pp. 297–301; A. GUILMOT & Y. NINANE,
loose-leaf, II.1.5-7; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-120-121; M.E.
STORME, 1990, pp. 100–101.
63 L. CORNELIS, 2000, p. 261, 267; A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 10; I. DEMUYNCK, 2002, p. 70; F.
DUMON, 1978–1979, pp. 299–301; M.E. STORME, 1990, p. 101; M. VAN HOECKE, De
interpretatievrijheid van de rechter, Kluwer, Antwerpen 1979, pp. 76–79 (hereinafter abbreviated
M. VAN HOECKE, 1979).
64 W. DE BONDT, 1996–1997, pp. 1004–1008; F. VERMANDER, 2005, p. 24.
65 Cass. 13 Jan. 1961, Pas. 1961, I, p. 515; Cass. 10 Nov. 1961; Pas. 1961, I, p. 259; Cass. 20 Dec.
1962, Pas. 1963, I, p. 493; Cass. 28 Mar. 1963, Pas. 1963, I, p. 824; Cass. 20 Sep. 1963, Pas.
1964, I, p. 68; Cass. 28 Nov. 1963, Pas. 1964, I, p. 336; Cass. 29 May 1964, Pas. 1964, I, p.
1019; RW 1965–1966, p. 197, note C. CANEPEEL; Cass. 9 Oct. 1964, Pas. 1965, I, p. 134;
Cass. 5 Nov. 1964, Pas. 1965, I, p. 230; Cass. 26 Nov. 1964, Pas. 1965, I, p. 306; Cass. 10 Jun.
1965, Pas. 1965, I, p. 1090; Cass. 18 Jun. 1965, Pas. 1965, I, p. 1137; RW 1965–1966, p. 1496;
Cass. 12 May 1966, JT 1967, p. 43; Pas. 1966, I, p. 1137; RGAR 1967, nr. 7842; Cass. 8 Sep.
1966, Arr. Cass. 1967, p. 29; Pas. 1967, I, p. 27; Cass. 22 Dec. 1966, Arr. Cass. 1967, p. 520;
Pas. 1967, I, p. 516; Cass. 19 May 1967, Arr. Cass. 1967, p. 1121, Pas. 1967, I, p. 1085; Cass.
25 Sep. 1967, Arr. Cass. 1968, p. 114; RW 1967–1968, p. 1174; Pas. 1968, I, p. 106; Cass. 14
May 1970, Arr. Cass. 1970, p. 866; Pas. 1970, I, p. 809; Cass. 27 Mar. 1973, Arr. Cass. 1973, p.
750; Pas. 1973, I, p. 713; Cass. 27 Jun. 1975, Arr. Cass. 1975, p. 1163; Pas. 1975, I, p. 1053;
Cass. 3 Oct. 1975, Arr. Cass. 1976, p. 155; T. Aann. 1979, p. 407; Pas. 1976, I, p. 146; Cass. 5
Nov. 1976, Arr. Cass. 1977, p. 268; Pas. 1977, I, p. 266; Cass. 18 Feb. 1977, Arr. Cass. 1977,
p. 675; Pas. 1977, I, p. 652; Cass. 10 Nov. 1978, Arr. Cass. 1978–1979, p. 297; Pas. 1979, I, p.
307; Cass. 27 Apr. 1979, Arr. Cass. 1979, p. 1023; Pas. 1979, I, p. 1017; JT 1980, p. 372; Cass.
6 Sep. 1979, Arr. Cass. 1979–1980, p. 11, note; Pas. 1980, I, p. 10; Cass. 25 Sep. 1980, Arr.
Cass. 1980–1981, p. 89; Bull. 1981, p. 89; Pas. 1981, I, p. 89; Cass. 29 Jan. 1981, Arr. Cass.
1980–1981, p. 600; Bull. 1981, p. 581; Pas. 1981, I, p. 581; RGAR 1981, nr. 10.407; Cass. 29
Sep. 1982, Arr. Cass. 1982–1983, p. 152; Bull. 1983, p. 137; De Verz. 1984, p. 121, note J.R.;
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the power of the judge.66 Although interpreting contracts forms a sovereign
authority of the lower judge, a limited review by the Court of Cassation is
possible.67 On the one hand, the Court controls whether or not the judge is
mindful of the duty to state the reasons on which his decision is based (Art. 149 of
the Constitution) and whether the given motivation is legally correct.68 On the
other hand, the Court checks whether or not the evidential value of the act is
violated by verifying if the given meaning is a plausible interpretation of the
agreement.69 The Court only has the power to undertake a limited judicial review:
solely in cases where the explanation of the judge is manifestly incompatible with
the terms of the agreement, it can quash the decision.70
5.2.3. Additional Rules Specifying Article 1156 CC
a. Article 1163 CC: However general the terms in which an agreement is
phrased may be, it shall include only the things upon which the parties appear
to have intended to contract.
Article 1163 CC describes the principle of a restrictive interpretation.71 The
generality of the terms used in a contract is only indicative and sometimes needs
to be corrected in relation to the real intention of the parties.72 An expression or
a description in a contract can be formulated in a very general way, even when the
Pas. 1983, I, p. 137; RGAR 1983, nr. 10656, note M. GODFROID; Cass. 19 Feb. 1987, Arr.
Cass. 1986–1987, p. 817; Bull. 1987, p. 738; Pas. 1987, I, p. 738; RGAR 1989, nr. 11.505;
Cass. 18 Nov. 1988, Arr. Cass. 1988–1989, 338; Bull. 1989, p. 311; Pas. 1989, I, p. 311; RW
1989–1990, p. 324, note; Cass. 24 Sep. 1992, Arr. Cass. 1991–1992, p. 1131; Bull. 1992, p.
1052; Pas. 1992, I, p. 1052; RW 1992–1993, p. 789; Cass. 7 May 1998, Arr. Cass. 1998, p. 494;
Bull. 1998, p. 524; Cass. 23 Oct. 2009, Arr. Cass. 2009, p. 2462; L. CORNELIS, 2000, p. 276;
B. DE CONINCK, 2001, p. 41; B. DELCOURT, loose-leaf, II.1.3-113; I. DEMUYNCK, 2002, p.
74; A. GUILMOT & Y. NINANE, loose-leaf, II.1.5-7, II.1.5-31-86; B. VEECKMANS,
‘Interpretatie en aanverwante rechtsbegrippen in geschillen tussen contractanten’, Limb. Rechtsl.
2000, p. 337 (hereinafter abbreviated B. VEECKMANS, 2000); F. VERMANDER, 2005, pp.
26–27.
66 A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 11; B. VEECKMANS, 2000, p. 337.
67 A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 12; W. DE BONDT, 1996–1997, pp. 1006–1007; B. DE CONINCK,
2001, p. 41; H. DE PAGE, 1964, pp. 551–553.
68 L. CORNELIS, 2000, p. 276; A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 12; B. DE CONINCK, 2001, p. 40; W. DE
BONDT, 1996–1997, p. 1007; F. DUMON, 1978–1979, pp. 258–275; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS
& N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-128-129.
69 L. CORNELIS, 2000, pp. 276–277; A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 12; B. DE CONINCK, 2001, p. 41;
W. DE BONDT, 1996–1997, p. 1007; F. DUMON, 1978–1979, p. 276.
70 A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 12; W. DE BONDT, 1996–1997, p. 1007; F. VERMANDER, 2005,
p. 27.
71 A. GUILMOT & Y. NINANE, loose-leaf, II.1.5-14.
72 E. CAUSIN, 1978, p. 308; L. CORNELIS, 2000, p. 261, 279; A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 20; D.
LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-134.
1337
parties did not mean to include everything that comes under the general terms. If
that is the case, the interpreter should, according to Article 1163 CC, reduce the
generality to the specific thing the parties intended. This rule constitutes merely
an application of Article 1156 CC.73
A contract for the sale of a computer system was concluded between a
supplier and a client. When problems arose regarding the delivery of the system,
the client was of the opinion that the obligation of the supplier assumed that
results would be achieved. The Commercial Court of Brussels judged however
that the commitment of the supplier to respect the performances as stipulated by
the client in the specifications was an obligation of means. After all, the contract
was drafted with a lot of care and precision as to the terms. If the parties would
have wanted to include an obligation that results would be achieved, they would
not have inserted the word respect but the word realize. The term respect is a
general term and must be interpreted in line with the intention of the parties (Art.
1163 CC).74
A stipulation of a car insurance policy stated that in case of an accident, no
compensation would be awarded to the passengers of the vehicle if the use of
intoxicants by the driver was established. An accident occurred when the driver
had been drinking alcohol, but the amount was so low that it could not have
created any risk for an accident. The Court of Cassation judged that the lower
judge could, according to Article 1156 CC, decide that the parties could not have
reasonably meant to exclude the passengers from compensation when there
clearly was no causal link between the use of alcoholics and the accident.75 In the
case at hand, the decision was based on Article 1156 CC, but Article 1163 CC
could have been used as a valuable legal ground as well.76
b. Article 1164 CC: Where in a contract one case was expressed for explaining
the obligation, it shall not be deemed that it was thereby intended to reduce the
scope of the agreement which extends as of right to cases not expressed.
In line with Article 1164 CC, enumerations in a contract are merely exemplary
and should not be interpreted in a restrictive way, unless it is the common
intention of the parties that they are illustrative.77 Article 1164 CC thus reflects
73 E. CAUSIN, 1978, p. 308; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-134.
74 Comm. C. Brussels 18 Feb. 1980, BRH 1980, p. 377; RGAR 1981, nr. 10.274.
75 Cass. 7 Jan. 1966, RW 1965–1966, p. 1846; Pas. 1966, I, p. 595; RGAR 1966, nr. 7709.
76 E. CAUSIN, 1978, p. 308; L. CORNELIS, 2000, pp. 261 and 309.
77 L. CORNELIS, 2000, pp. 261 and 279; A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 20; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS &
N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-134.
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the principle of an extensive interpretation, broadening the scope of the
agreement.78 Again, this rule is an application of Article 1156 CC.79
The Court of Appeal of Paris judged that it resulted clearly from the
provisions of a tenancy agreement that the parties wanted to inflict all burdens
relating to the use and maintenance of the building upon the tenant, including
the costs to be paid for the communal facilities. It follows that the costs of
collective security have to be paid by the tenant, even if they are not mentioned
expressly in the clause in which the expenses to be paid by the tenant are
enumerated.80
5.2.4. Additional Rules to Discover the Hypothetical Intention of the Parties
a. Article 1157 CC: Where a clause admits of two meanings, one shall rather
understand it in the one with which it may have some effect, than in the
meaning with which it could not produce any.
Consistent with Article 1157 CC, the right interpretation of an ambiguous
provision is the one that ensures it has legal effects. Article 1157 CC makes sure
that the contract can have an effet utile.81 The article encloses two components.
On the one hand, interpretation should be carried out in a way in which
the contract or a separate clause is valid rather than in the sense in which it would
be null and void: actus interpretandus est potius ut valeat quam pereat.82,83
For instance, the Court of Appeal of Liège judged that a clause in a private
contract for the sale of an immovable property, stating that the buyer would
acquire the full ownership of the property as from the date of the authentic
document and of the payment, did not contain a suspensive condition but a term
for the transfer of ownership. Including a suspensive condition would after all
amount to an arbitrary condition, which would bring about the nullity of the
agreement (Art. 1174 CC).84
78 A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 20; A. GUILMOT & Y. NINANE, loose-leaf, II.1.14; D. LEJEUNE, K.
SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-134.
79 E. CAUSIN, 1978, p. 308.
80 CA Paris, 17 Nov. 2004, Juris Data No. 2004-267178.
81 E. CAUSIN, 1978, p. 307; B. DELCOURT, loose-leaf, II.1.3-114; A. GUILMOT & Y. NINANE,
loose-leaf, II.1.5-14.
82 ‘An act should be interpreted in a way that it can have effect rather than in a way it would be
null.’
83 E. CAUSIN, 1978, p. 306; L. CORNELIS, 2000, pp. 261 and 279; A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 15;
B. DE CONINCK, 2001, p. 42; B. DELCOURT, loose-leaf, II.1.3-114; R. KRUITHOF,
H. BOCKEN, F. DE LY & B. DE TEMMERMAN, 1994, p. 450; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS &
N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-134.
84 C. Liège 11 Mar. 2004, FJF 2004, p. 1034.
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A second aspect of Article 1157 CC is that where a clause admits of two
meanings, one shall understand it in the one with which it may have some effect
than in the meaning with which it could not produce any.85
When an insurance policy, connected to a travel or a holiday policy, only
covers damage resulting from the theft of objects from an isolated trunk, then the
terms need to be interpreted in the sense of each trunk. Otherwise, the clause
would be meaningless.86
b. Article 1158 CC: Terms which admit of two meanings shall be taken in the
meaning which best suits the subject matter of the contract.
Article 1158 CC indicates that interpreting should be carried out in line with the
economy and the general meaning of the contract.87 The economy of the contract
refers to all the elements that have played a role in concluding the contract, by
balancing the different aims the parties want to achieve.88 If terms are ambiguous,
the context of the whole of the document needs to be taken into account.89
A term of an employment contract was interpreted in favour of the
employee, because such an interpretation is in accordance with the protecting
aspect of labour law in general and with every employment contract in
particular.90
Because of an explosion in a building causing a fire, a car parked outside
the property was damaged. In the insurance policy of the liable person, the
damage inflicted on neighbours was included. The judge stated that the term
neighbour can have two different meanings, either based on proximity or based on
proximity and constancy. According to Article 1158 CC, the first interpretation is
the appropriate one in this case.91
85 A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 16; R. KRUITHOF, H. BOCKEN, F. DE LY & B. DE TEMMERMAN,
1994, p. 450; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-134.
86 JoP. C. Hasselt 4 Jan. 1983, Limb. Rechtsl. 1983, 100, note.
87 Pol. C. Mechelen 31 Mar. 2006, RW 2007–2008, p. 81; I. DEMUYNCK, 2002, p. 71; A.
GUILMOT & Y. NINANE, loose-leaf, II.1.5-14; D. PHILIPPE, ‘Economie contractuelle, cause,
erreur et interprétation du contrat’, in E. Dirix (ed.), Liber Amicorum Jacques Herbots, Kluwer,
Antwerpen 2002, p. 307.
88 D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-127.
89 K. LEWISON, 2007, pp. 21–29 and G. MCMEEL, 2011, p. 243.
90 Ind. C.A. Mons 8 May 1987, JT 1988, 140.
91 C. Liège 30 May 1961, RGAR 1961, nr. 6761, note O. MALTER.
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c. Article 1161 CC: All the clauses of an agreement are to be interpreted with
reference to one another by giving to each one the meaning which results from
the whole instrument.
Article 1161 CC stresses the importance of intrinsic elements. In order to
interpret an agreement, all the terms and clauses of the contract should be used.92
A holistic approach towards contracts is needed, meaning that a clause must not
be considered in isolation but in the meaning that results from the whole
instrument.93 In fact, this rule is an enlargement of the general proposition that
an individual word takes its meaning from the context in which it is found.94
Article 1161 CC and Article 1159 CC are very close to each other but differ in the
sense that Article 1156 CC comes into play when there is doubt as to the
interpretation of terms, whereas Article 1161 CC has a role in the interpretation
of provisions.
An insurance policy concluded by a car dealer states that the cars in
possession of the policyholder are insured insofar as they are located in the
showroom and/or in the building and/or inside the fence of the policyholder
and/or wherever in Belgium. In accordance with Article 1161 CC, that clause
means, according to the Commercial Court of Brussels, that the cars should be
located in a building or in a fenced-off area of the policyholder, which is situated
in Belgium. The theft of a car in Belgium that was placed in a non-enclosed car
park of the policyholder was not covered by the insurance policy.95
d. Article 1159 CC: What is ambiguous shall be interpreted by what is in use
in the region where the contract was made.
Usage can be useful to the act of interpretation. After all, it is logic that the
common intention of the parties concluding a contract should be in line by what
is in use in the region where the contract was made.96 Usages are local rules of
which the applicability to a certain contractual relationship is generally
acknowledged.97 Despite its possible usefulness, this article is not relied upon
much by Belgian judges.98
92 Cass. 10 Nov. 1960, Pas. 1961, I, p. 267; Res Jur. Imm. 1960, p. 437; Cass. 9 Oct. 1964, Pas.
1965, I, p. 134; Cass. 25 Mar. 1965, Pas. 1965, I, p. 788; Cass. 13 May 1966, Pas. 1966, I, p.
1158.
93 D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-136; K. LEWISON, 2007, pp. 21–29
and G. MCMEEL, 2011, p. 243.
94 K. LEWISON, 2007, pp. 21–29 and G. MCMEEL, 2011, p. 243.
95 Comm. C. Brussels 20 Apr. 1998 RHA 1998, p. 440.
96 L. CORNELIS, 2000, pp. 261 and 279.
97 A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 17; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-136.
98 A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 17.
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The Court of Appeal of Brussels called upon Article 1159 CC when it
judged that the calculation of a mediator’s commission should be interpreted in
line with the general usage that the wage is to be calculated on the basis of the
real price of the conveyance.99
5.2.5. Subsidiary Rule: Interpretation against the Person Who Has Stipulated the
Clause
Article 1162 CC, stating that in case of doubt, an agreement shall be interpreted
against the one who has stipulated and in favour of the one who has contracted
the obligation, lacks any kind of familiarity with an intention whatsoever. Article
1162 is an autonomous rule of law according to which disputes about
interpretation are settled in a way different from the usual, subjective, one.100
When the judge fails to establish the meaning of the agreement consistent with
the common intention of the parties, he can resort to Article 1162 CC.
Interpretation against the one who has stipulated means, according to the
Court of Cassation, an interpretation against the party who is favoured by the
clause under investigation, even when there is no clue that this corresponds with
the common intention.101 Consequently, an exemption clause must be interpreted
in favour of the creditor and a damages clause in favour of the debtor.102 When
interpreting a reciprocal agreement, it is necessary not to investigate the contract
in general but every provision separately.103
5.3. Towards an Objective Approach?
5.3.1. Introduction
The enumeration of Belgian interpretation rules sketches a subjective picture.
The determination of what the parties meant by the language used does not, as it
99 Brussels 17 Mar. 1982, RW 1983–1984, p. 2829.
100 Cass. 28 Oct. 1983, Arr. Cass. 1983–1984, p. 245; Bull. 1984, p. 228; Pas. 1984, I, p. 228; RW
1983–1984, p. 1078.
101 Cass. 22 Mar. 1979, Arr. Cass. 1978, p. 860; Pas. 1979, I, p. 863; RCJB 1981, p. 189, note L.
CORNELIS; RGAR 1980, nr. 10.222; RW 1979–1980, p. 2238; T. Aann. 1982, p. 296, note P.
MANDOUX; L. CORNELIS, 2000, pp. 280 and 279; A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 21; B. DE
CONINCK, 2001, p. 42; I. DEMUYNCK, 2002, p. 72; R. KRUITHOF, H. BOCKEN, F. DE LY &
B. DE TEMMERMAN, 1994, pp. 452–453; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf,
II.4-137; F. VERMANDER, 2005, p. 29.
102 D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-137.
103 Cass. 6 Jun. 1958, Pas. 1958, I, 1105; Cass. 22 Mar. 1979, RCJB 1981, p. 189; Cass. 27 Apr.
1979, Pas. 1979, I, p. 1016; A. DE BOECK, 2010, pp. 21–22; E. CAUSIN, 1978, p. 313; E.
DIRIX & A. VAN OEVELEN, ‘Kroniek van het verbintenissenrecht (1985–1992)’, RW
1992–1993, p. 1222; R. KRUITHOF, H. BOCKEN, F. DE LY & B. DE TEMMERMAN, 1994, p.
452; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-137; S. STIJNS, D. VAN
GERVEN & P. WÉRY, ‘Chronique de jurisprudence. Les obligations: les sources (1985–1995)’,
JT 1996, p. 717; P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, 1986, p. 174.
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is the case in English common law, involve ascertaining what a reasonable person,
having all the background knowledge that would reasonably have been available
to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract,
would have understood the parties to have meant. However, the modern view on
interpretation refines the subjective viewpoint, granting a more prominent role to
reasonableness and fairness than the one-sided position described above. In this
part, we investigate whether or not a Belgian judge would take into account
reasonableness and fairness.
5.3.2. Reasonable Interpretation
5.3.2.1. Limits to Party Autonomy
Often a contract has binding force in more ways than the parties have agreed
upon. In concluding an agreement, the contractual freedom is of primordial
importance. However, the intention of the parties is not the only source of
contractual obligations. First, parties often envisage only the essentials when they
conclude a contract, leaving gaps in the agreement.104 Article 1135 CC states that
Agreements are binding not only as to what is therein expressed, but also as to all
the consequences which equity, usage or statute give to the obligation according to
its nature. In every conflict of interpretation, the interpreter therefore needs to
answer two questions.105 First, what are the rights and obligations the parties
wanted to create? Second, what are the rights and obligations arising from
fairness, usage, and the law?
Besides, not the internal intention of the parties is decisive for obligations
to come into being but the intention as it is exchanged between the parties by
means of words.106 The declaration of intent, as it is voiced by one party and
trusted upon by the other party, is indicative for the concluded obligations.107
When there is a discrepancy between the real and the declared intention, the
content of the agreement is determined by what the other party reasonably could
have understood the given statement to mean (vertrouwensleer).108 This principle,
104 E. CAUSIN, 1978, p. 283; W. VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER, 2010, pp. 73 and 95.
105 E. CAUSIN, 1978, p. 283.
106 A. DE BOECK, ‘Wilsuiting: werkelijke wil – uitgedrukte wil – veinzing’, in Bijzondere
overeenkomsten. Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer.
Commentaar verbintenissenrecht, Titel II. Contractenrecht, Mechelen, loose-leaf, w.p. (hereinafter
abbreviated A. DE BOECK, loose-leaf); W. VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER, 2010, pp.
73–74.
107 A. DE BOECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; W. VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER, 2010, p. 73.
108 Cass. 20 Jan. 1988, JT 1989, p. 547; L. CORNELIS, ‘Rechtsverwerking: een toepassing van de
goede trouw?’, TPR 1990, pp. 574–576, 630–633 (hereinafter abbreviated L. CORNELIS, 1990);
A. DE BOECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; F. DE LY, ‘Het gelijkheidsbeginsel in het contractenrecht’, RW
1991–1992, p. 1153 (hereinafter abbreviated F. DE LY, 1991–1992); W. VAN GERVEN & S.
COVEMAEKER, 2010, p. 73; F. VERMANDER, 2005, p. 23.
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which is included in Article II.-4:302 DCFR,109 does not devalue the lawmaking
power of the will. After all, in most cases, there is a concordance between what
the parties wanted and what they declared, especially regarding the main features
of a contract.110
A third source of contractual obligations is embodied in Article 1134,
paragraph 3 CC, according to which agreements must be performed in good faith.
Good faith is in that sense an objective concept, which allows the judge to control
whether or not the parties’ conduct is reasonable and fair.111 The concept is thus
equated with fairness and reasonableness.112 The exact obligations binding the
parties are, in case of dispute, established by a judge by means of interpretation
and gap filling. Once the commitments of the parties are clarified, another task
rests upon the judge: checking whether or not the parties abused the law by not
performing the agreement in a moderate way. Traditionally, good faith plays a
role in all three stages, having an interpretative, a complementary, and a
moderating function.113
109 Article II.-4:302 DCFR: ‘How intention is determined. The intention of a party to be legally
bound or to achieve the relevant legal effect is to be determined from the party’s statements or
conduct as they were reasonably understood by the person to whom the act is addressed’.
110 A. DE BOECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; W. VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER, 2010, pp. 96–109.
111 J. BAECK, ‘Gevolgen tussen partijen (verbintenissen)’, in Bijzondere overeenkomsten.
Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer, Kluwer, Mechelen,
loose-leaf, w.p. (hereinafter abbreviated J. BAECK, loose-leaf); F. BAERT, ‘De goede trouw bij de
uitvoering van overeenkomsten’, RW 1956–1957, p. 492 (hereinafter abbreviated F. BAERT,
1956–1957, p. 492); H. COUSY, ‘Goede trouw in het verzekeringscontract’, in Liber Amicorum
Jan Ronse, Story-Scientia, Brussels 1986, p. 16 (hereinafter abbreviated H. COUSY, 1986);
S. STIJNS, ‘Abus, mais de quel(s) droit(s)? Réflexions sur l’exécution de bonne foi des contrats et
l’abus de droits contractuels’, JT 1990, p. 33 (hereinafter abbreviated S. STIJNS, 1990);
B. VEECKMANS, 2000, p. 345.
112 F. BAERT, 1956–1957, p. 495; L. CORNELIS, 1990, p. 565; E. DIRIX, ‘Over de beperkende
werking van de goede trouw’, TBH 1988, p. 665 (hereinafter abbreviated E. DIRIX, 1988);
D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-142; M.E. STORME, 1990, p. 116;
W. VAN GERVEN & A. DEWAELE, ‘Goede trouw en getrouw beeld’, in Liber Amicorum Jan
Ronse, Story-Scientia, Brussels 1986, p. 107 (hereinafter abbreviated W. VAN GERVEN &
A. DEWAELE, 1986); B. VEECKMANS, 2000, p. 337.
113 J. BAECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; F. BAERT, 1956–1957, p. 498; L. CORNELIS, 1990, p. 579; A. DE
BOECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; S. DEBUSSCHERE, ‘Noot: De goede trouw bij de uitvoering van
overeenkomsten: een niet te onderschatten instrument in handen van de rechtspracticus’, TWVR
1997, p. 189 (hereinafter abbreviated S. DEBUSSCHERE, 1997); R. KRUITHOF, H. BOCKEN,
F. DE LY & B. DE TEMMERMAN, 1994, pp. 460–446; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS &
N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-142; S. STIJNS, 1990, pp. 34–36; S. STIJNS, 2005, p. 59; W. VAN
GERVEN & A. DEWAELE, 1986, pp. 104–105; P. VAN OMMESLAEGHE, ‘L’exécution de bonne
foi, principe général de droit?’, TBBR 1987, pp. 101–105 (hereinafter abbreviated P. VAN
OMMESLAEGHE, 1987); B. VEECKMANS, 2000, p. 345; F. VERMANDER, ‘Noot – De
aanvullende werking van het beginsel van de uitvoering te goeder trouw van contracten in de
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5.3.2.2. The Role of Good Faith
Initially, an interpretative content-determining function was allotted to the
principle of good faith as set down in Article 1134, paragraph 3 CC: Based on the
primacy of the will, the rule was supposed to aim merely at the search for the real
intention of the parties, assuming that not the literal terms but the spirit of the
agreement must be a decisive interpretative factor.114 Gradually, the principle of
good faith obtained a larger and more creative role. The second complementary
function of good faith enables the judge to impose additional obligations, for
instance, the obligation to cooperate, to act loyal, to provide information, to limit
damages, and so on.115 The moderating, limiting, restrictive, or correcting role of
good faith, which is linked to the prohibition on abuse of the law, is accepted by
the Court of Cassation in a judgment of 19 September 1983.116
21ste eeuw: inburgering in de rechtspraak, weerspiegeling in de wetgeving en sanctionering’,
TBBR 2004, p. 572 (hereinafter abbreviated F. VERMANDER, 2004); F. VERMANDER, 2005,
p. 31.
114 J. BAECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; F. BAERT, 1956–1957, pp. 491–492; L. CORNELIS, 1990, pp.
580–581; H. COUSY, 1986, p. 13; A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 30; A. DE BOECK, loose-leaf, w.p.;
S. DEBUSSCHERE, 1997, p. 189; R. KRUITHOF, H. BOCKEN, F. DE LY & B. DE
TEMMERMAN, 1994, pp. 459–461; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf,
II.4-142-142a; L. SIMONT, ‘De l’effet des obligations’, JT 2004, p. 294 (hereinafter abbreviated
L. SIMONT, 2004); S. STIJNS, 1990, p. 34; M.E. STORME, 1990, p. 103; P. VAN
OMMESLAEGHE, 1987, pp. 102–103; B. VEECKMANS, 2000, p. 346; F. VERMANDER, 2004,
p. 575; F. VERMANDER, 2005, p. 31.
115 J. BAECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; F. BAERT, 1956–1957, pp. 499–502; L. CORNELIS, 1990, pp.
584–585; H. COUSY, 1986, p. 14, pp. 22–25; A. DE BOECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; F. DE LY,
1991–1992, p. 1155; S. DEBUSSCHERE, 1997, p. 189; B. DELCOURT, loose-leaf,
II.1.3-115-116; R. KRUITHOF, H. BOCKEN, F. DE LY & B. DE TEMMERMAN, 1994, p. 459,
pp. 461–469; L. SIMONT, 2004, p. 294; S. STIJNS, 2005, pp. 61–62; S. STIJNS, 1990, p. 35; W.
VAN GERVEN & A. DEWAELE, 1986, pp. 105–107 W. VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER,
2010, pp. 99–100; B. VEECKMANS, 2000, p. 346, 348; F. VERMANDER, 2004, pp. 576–578; F.
VERMANDER, 2005, p. 31, pp. 34–38, 40–43.
116 Cass. 19 Sep. 1983, Arr. Cass. 1983–1984, p. 52; Pas. 1984, I, p. 55; RW 1983–1984, p. 1480;
RCJB 1986, p. 282, note J.L. FAGNART; JT 1985, p. 56, note S. DUFRENE; Cass. 17 May 1990,
Arr. Cass. 1989–1990, p. 1188; Pas. 1990, I, p. 1061, RW 1990–1991, p. 1085; JT 1990, p. 442;
RCJB 1990, p. 595, note J. HEENEN; TBH 1991, p. 207, note S. CNUDDE; JLMB 1990, p. 881,
note P. HENRY; Cass. 20 Feb. 1992, Arr. Cass. 1991–1992, p. 583; Pas. 1992, I, p. 549; JT
1992, p. 454, note; Cass. 1 Feb. 1996, Arr. Cass. 1996, p. 139; Pas. 1996, I, p. 158; Cass. 30
Jan. 2003, JLMB 2004, p. 672; Pas. 2003, 227; RW 2005–2006, p. 1219; TBBR 2004, p. 405; J.
BAECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; F. BAERT, 1956–1957, pp. 502–510; L. CORNELIS, 1990, pp.
585–589; H. COUSY, 1986, pp. 14–15, 25–28; S. DEBUSSCHERE, 1997, p. 189; B.
DELCOURT, loose-leaf, II.1.3-116; F. DE LY, 1991–1992, pp. 1154–1155; E. DIRIX, 1988, pp.
664–665; E. DIRIX & A. VAN OEVELEN, ‘Kroniek van het verbintenissenrecht (1981-1984)’,
RW 1985–1986, p. 93; R. KRUITHOF, H. BOCKEN, F. DE LY & B. DE TEMMERMAN, 1994,
pp. 459 and 469–487; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-142a; L.
SIMONT, 2004, p. 294; S. STIJNS, 1990, pp. 35–44; S. STIJNS, 2005, pp. 62–72; W. VAN
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The concrete filling-in of the interpretative function was repeatedly
criticized. Since it was too close to the disposition of Article 1156 CC, it was
considered not to add anything to the general interpretation rules.117 Two
solutions were put forward. On the one hand, some scholars denied that any
interpretative value could be bestowed upon the good faith principle, which is
only a rule of conduct.118 Article 1134, paragraph 3 CC concerns, in this
viewpoint, merely the performance of the agreement, not the interpretation.119
After all, the rule is situated in the Civil Code in the section covering the general
provisions concerning the consequences of contracts, whereas the interpretation
rules are clustered in a separate division.120 On the other hand, another function
is granted to the interpretative role: an interpretation according to reasonableness
and fairness.121 The same role is assigned to good faith (Art. 1134, para. 3 CC)
and reasonableness (Art. 1135 CC), namely to be a source to determine the
content of obligations.122 This way of interpreting is called reasonable
interpretation. It differs from normative interpretation (see infra) in the sense that
the interpretative power of the judge is smaller, since the concept does not
encompass gap filling nor abuse of the law. Interpreting according to good faith,
which is in line with reasonableness and fairness, means that the interpreter
should, in his search for the common intention of the parties, be led by the sense
one can reasonably attach to the mutually made declarations, paying attention to
the surrounding circumstances.123 In this view, it is supposed that what is agreed
between the parties can be discovered by interpreting the agreement not
according to the literal terms but following the demands of reasonableness and
GERVEN & A. DEWAELE, 1986, pp. 107–112; K. VANDERSCHOT, ‘De sanctionering van
abusieve partijbeslissingen genomen bij contractuele wanprestatie: de verschillende gedaantes
van de matigende werking van de goede trouw’, TBBR 2005, pp. 87–99; W. VAN GERVEN & S.
COVEMAEKER, 2010, pp. 100–105; B. VEECKMANS, 2000, p. 346; F. VERMANDER, 2004,
pp. 575–576; F. VERMANDER, 2005, pp. 38–40.
117 F. BAERT, 1956–1957, p. 495; H. COUSY, 1986, p. 13; A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 30; A. DE
BOECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; L. SIMONT, 2004, p. 294; R. KRUITHOF, H. BOCKEN, F. DE LY &
B. DE TEMMERMAN, 1994, p. 460; S. STIJNS, 1990, p. 34; S. STIJNS, 2005, p. 59; M.E.
STORME, 1990, p. 103; W. VAN GERVEN & A. DEWAELE, 1986, pp. 104–105; F.
VERMANDER, 2004, p. 575.
118 F. BAERT, 1956–1957, p. 495; H. COUSY, 1986, p. 14; F. DE LY, 1991–1992, p. 1155; J.
FAGNART, ‘L’exécution de bonne foi des conventions: un principe en expansion’, RCJB 1986, p.
289; S. STIJNS, 1990, p. 34.
119 F. BAERT, 1956–1957, p. 458; H. COUSY, 1986, p. 14.
120 F. BAERT, 1956–1957, p. 495.
121 J. BAECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; L. CORNELIS, 1990, pp. 583–584; A. DE BOECK, loose-leaf, w.p.;
A. DE BOECK & M. VAN HOECKE, 2008, p. 206; W. DE BONDT, 1996–1997, p. 1013; B.
DELCOURT, loose-leaf, II.1.3-113, 115; S. STIJNS, 1990, p. 34; W. VAN GERVEN & A.
DEWAELE, 1986, p. 105; A. VAN OEVELEN, 2006–2007, p. 875.
122 M.E. STORME, 1990, p. 109.
123 W. VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER, 2010, pp. 97–98.
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fairness.124 This means that an agreement should be interpreted in light of what
would have been the will of a bonus pater familias, a contractual party, who is
prudent and diligent.125
The concept of reasonable interpretation arose from a problem that is
often met in practice: detecting the common intention of the parties at a moment
in which there is a dispute about it is difficult. The occurrence of use of form
agreements, contracts of adhesion, and standard clauses makes this exercise even
harder, since entering in such agreements, the parties did not necessary share the
same intention at the time of concluding the contract. The common intention is
limited to the essential elements of the contract, and the entrant depends on the
conditions forced on him by the editor of the contract. If no common intention
can be discovered, interpretation needs to be carried out by way of objective
criteria, such as Articles 1157, 1158, 1159, and 1161 CC and Article 1134,
paragraph 3 CC.126 The presupposition that contracting parties are reasonable
persons has a legal ground in Articles 1157 and 1158 CC, two rules on how to
ascertain the hypothetical intention based on reasonableness.127
5.3.2.3. Is a Reasonable Interpretation Possible?
The question arises whether interpreting in a reasonable way is possible in a
subjective system such as the Belgian one.
First of all, the role assigned to interpretation depends on the measure in
which one separates the phase of performance from the interpretation of an
agreement.128 Interpretation in principle aims at the determination of the
obligations of the parties in abstracto, separate from how they are performed.129
However, the need for an exact description of the parties’ obligations by way of
interpretation arises in practice during the phase of performance.130 When
obligations are not performed, the judge has to interpret in abstracto and apply
the contract in concreto at once.131 Interpretation and performance are de facto
entangled. Consequently, Article 1134, paragraph 3 CC has a role to play
regarding the interpretation as well as the performance of contracts.
Second, a reasonable interpretation does not conflict with Article 1156 CC:
The aim of interpreting in a reasonable way is finding out the common intention
124 W. VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER, 2010, p. 97.
125 L. CORNELIS, 1990, p. 583; B. DELCOURT, loose-leaf, II.1.3-113.
126 B. VEECKMANS, 2000, p. 348.
127 A. DE BOECK & M. VAN HOECKE, 2008, pp. 235–236; B. VEECKMANS, 2000, p. 348.
128 S. STIJNS, 1990, p. 34; W. VAN GERVEN & A. DEWAELE, 1986, p. 105; A. VAN OEVELEN,
2006–2007, p. 875.
129 S. STIJNS, 1990, p. 34; W. VAN GERVEN & A. DEWAELE, 1986, p. 105.
130 S. STIJNS, 1990, p. 34; W. VAN GERVEN & A. DEWAELE, 1986, p. 105; A. VAN OEVELEN,
2006–2007, pp. 875–876; B. VEECKMANS, 2000, p. 347.
131 S. STIJNS, 1990, p. 34; W. VAN GERVEN & A. DEWAELE, 1986, p. 105.
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of the parties. Article 1134, paragraph 3 CC merely describes a way for reaching
this purpose. It therefore deserves a place between the additional rules to discover
the hypothetical intention of the parties. Those rules, used when the real intention
of the parties cannot be discovered, are based on objective elements and inspired
by reasonableness. Articles 1157, 1158, 1159, and 1161 CC should be seen as
application of the more general interpretation principle of Article 1134,
paragraph 3 CC.
It needs to be asked whether this viewpoint clashes with the case law of the
Court of Cassation, where it judges that the power of the lower judge is limited in
the sense that he is not allowed to deny the evidential value of the written act,
which means he cannot assign a meaning to the act that is conflicting with its
terms. Actually, it does not. Interpreting in a reasonable way means being led by
the sense one can reasonably attach to the mutually made declarations, so the
object of interpretation is, as the Court of Cassation wants it to be, the written
act.132
According to legal doctrine, a reasonable view on interpretation therefore
needs to be supported.133
Case law embraces this viewpoint as well. Sometimes a reasonable
interpretation is grounded on Article 1156 CC.
In the above-mentioned judgment of 7 January 1966, the Court of
Cassation judged that the lower judge could, in line with Article 1156 CC, decide
that the parties could not have reasonably meant to exclude the passengers from
compensation when there clearly was no causal link between the use of alcoholics
and the accident. The driver only had sipped from a beer, without really drinking.
The exclusion from coverage would, in view of the normal way of life in our
society, boil down to the fact that the insurance, which of course was intended to
be useful consistent with the common will of the parties, would remain idle
words. The Court of Cassation emphasizes that the judge who searches for the
reasonable intention of the parties applies Article 1156 CC.134
A mother donated the family home to one of her daughters with a right of
usufruct attached. The common intention of the parties was to put the house
completely at the disposal of the daughter and her family, while the mother and
her husband would still live at the family home. Because of a worsening of the
relationship between the parties, co-habituation became impossible, which causes
the parents to leave and to writ against their daughter for her expulsion. The
judge stated that the only just solution that reconciles good faith and reality,
132 W. DE BONDT, 1996–1997, p. 1013.
133 Ibid., p. 1014.
134 Cass. 7 Jan. 1966, RW 1965–1966, p. 1846; Pas. 1966, I, p. 595; RGAR 1966, nr. 7709. See, for
a similar case, Liège 27 Mar. 1997, RRD 1997, p. 451.
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consists of organizing the usufruct according to what the parents would receive in
kind on the basis of the real will of the parties.135
A reasonable interpretation can also be grounded on the principle that
agreements need to be performed in line with good faith, as it is embodied in
Article 1134, paragraph 3 CC.
The binding force of the agreement in which it was stated that a property
must be enclosed by a hedge with three rows of barbed wire and in addition with
iron wire URSUS to a height of 1 meter was not violated by a judge who said that
planting a living hedge agrees with the purpose of the contract.136
In line with the specifications added to a tenancy agreement, the tenant
was responsible for the costs of reparations due to wear and tear and old age.
However, the judge stated that such a provision needs to be interpreted according
to good faith: When the premises are more than a hundred years old, and the
landlord and his predecessors in title have never kept the house in good repair,
there is no reason not to pay back the rent guarantee.137
A stipulation of a car insurance policy stated that the insurance company
had recourse against the insured person when the vehicle, at the moment of the
accident, is driven by a person who does not comply with the conditions required
by the Belgian law and regulations to drive a vehicle, for instance by a person
whose right to drive has been annulled or a person who has not reached the
minimum age. According to a Royal Decree, foreigners having their place of
residence in Belgium had to replace their foreign drivers licence with a Belgian
administrative piece. An Italian, who had not fulfilled this administrative duty,
had an accident. Hence, the insurance company proceeded for recovery. The
Court of Cassation judged that the non-observance of the administrative formality
cannot justify the recourse of the plaintiff, since the principle of agreement-law
needs to be interpreted and applied following the principle that contracts need to be
performed consistent with good faith.138
In an insurance policy covering water damage, it was stated that
compensation was excluded when the building was not heated and the hydraulic
installation was not emptied, if there was a causal relationship between the defect
and the loss. When a claim arose, the insurance company did not want to
compensate. However, the Court judged that agreements are to be interpreted in a
reasonable way and need to be performed consistent with good faith.139
135 JoP. C. Grâce-Hollogne 18 Mar. 2003, JLMB 2004, p. 1105.
136 Cass. 10 Nov. 1977, Arr. Cass. 1978, p. 305; Pas. 1978, I, p. 292.
137 JoP. C. St.-Jans-Molenbeek 7 Jun. 1988, T. JoP. C. 1989, p. 152.
138 Cass. 24 Sep. 1992, Arr. Cass. 1991–1992, p. 1131; Bull. 1992, p. 1052; Pas. 1992, I, p. 1052;
RW 1992–1993, p. 789.
139 Brussels 17 May 2000, RGAR 2002, nr. 13.504.
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The Court of Cassation judged that: In line with Article 1134, 3 CC
contracts have to be performed according to good faith. The judge has the power to
interpret the agreement looked at from the perspective of the performance in good
faith. However, he cannot impose obligations which are irreconcilable with the
nature and the purpose of the agreement. Therefore, the creditor on behalf of
whom a mandator gives an irrevocable mandate to a third party to mortgage one
or more of these properties in his name is allowed to determine when he wants to
exercise his mandate, on the condition that the possibility for the judge to
investigate afterwards whether the exercise fulfils the contractual provisions is not
devalued.140
A travel insurance covered, in case the insured person got injured in a
foreign country, the organization of medical contacts and, in case the repatriation
of the victim was necessary, also the transport back home. The Court of Appeal of
Liège judged that the interpretation according to good faith of the agreement
implied that this also covers the repatriation of the luggage.141
In its judgment of 23 March 2006, the Belgian Court of Cassation not only
explicitly acknowledged the interpretative function of good faith, whereas in the
other judgment the acceptance was rather implicit, it also explicitly grounded it
on Article 1134, paragraph 3 CC.142 It is therefore clear that a reasonable
interpretation is possible Belgium and that it should be grounded on the principle
of good faith as included in Article 1134, paragraph 3 CC.
5.3.2.4. Place in the Hierarchy
Cornelis is of the opinion that the general principle of good faith takes
precedence over the principle of party autonomy.143 It aims at imposing social
rules of conduct, possibly at the cost of rules determined by the parties, and
intends to assign to the victim of a denial of the principle of good faith the
advantages relied upon.144 Consequently, a reasonable interpretation takes
precedence over the traditional subjective viewpoint, as included in Article 1156
CC. However, this opinion cannot be supported, because it minimizes the
significance of the party autonomy, which is one of the pillars of the Belgian law
of obligations.
Article 1134, paragraph 3 CC is one of the additional rules to discover the
hypothetical intention of the parties. It therefore has the same place in the
hierarchy of interpretation rules as the other rules to discover the hypothetical
140 Cass. 23 Mar. 2006, Pas. 2006, p. 671; RW 2006–2007, p. 874, note A. VAN OEVELEN.
141 Liège 18 Nov. 2008, DCCR 2009, p. 97, note C. VERDURE.
142 A. VAN OEVELEN, 2006–2007, pp. 876–877.
143 L. CORNELIS, 1990, p. 600. See, for similar cases, Brussels 13 Sep. 2004, RGAR 2007, nr.
14.279 and Pol. Gent 4 Oct. 2010, TGR-TWVR 2011, p. 127.
144 L. CORNELIS, 1990, p. 602. See also E. CAUSIN, 1978, p. 332.
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intention. Like Articles 1157, 1158, 1159, and 1161 CC, the rule is subsidiary to
Article 1156 CC and is only used when the real intention of the parties cannot be
discovered. On the other hand, it is ranked above Article 1162 CC, which
occupies the lowest place in the hierarchy.
5.3.3. Normative Interpretation
Following some Dutch scholars,145 M.E. Storme furthered the role of good faith
in interpretation.146 Interpretation should, in his view, not cover the discovery of
the common intention of the parties.147 Understanding interpretation as a
determination of the content of a common intention is impossible when the actual
intentions of the parties did not completely correspond, which is the case in
almost every dispute – otherwise, no dispute would have arisen.148 Interpretation,
which is the whole activity of the judge, should be a very broad concept,
encompassing not only the traditional meaning of the concept but also gap filling
and even abuse of the law.149 Storme grounds his viewpoint on Article 1135 CC,
which obliges the judge to integrate the different factors that play a role in
interpretation.150 A judge needs to interpret an agreement not according to the
ordinary language, not according to the actual intention of the parties, but
consistent with the requirements of good faith (which means: what they should
mean).151 This approach is called normative interpretation, since the interpreter
does not describe the content of the contract but actually creates a new rule.152
Interpretation then is the process whereby the whole legal relationship that exists
between the parties is determined in line with good faith.153 Reasonableness,
145 Namely H.C.F. SCHOORDIJK, Het algemeen gedeelte van het verbintenissenrecht naar het nieuw
burgerlijk wetboek, Kluwer, Deventer 1979, p. 601 and J.M. VAN DUNNÉ, Normatieve uitleg van
rechtshandelingen: een onderzoek naar de grondslagen van het geldende verbintenissenrecht,
Kluwer, Deventer 1971, p. 478.
146 M.E. STORME, 1990, p. 544.
147 D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-142a; M.E. STORME, 1990, pp. 99
and 117.
148 M.E. STORME, p. 102.
149 J. BAECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; S. DEBUSSCHERE, 1997, p. 192; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N.
PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-142a; S. STIJNS, 2005, p. 60; M.E. STORME, 1990, pp. 7 and
112–113. See also E. DIRIX, 1988, pp. 664–665; F. VERMANDER, 2005, pp. 22 and 33.
150 M.E. STORME, 1990, p. 119.
151 J. BAECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; S. DEBUSSCHERE, 1997, p. 192; I. DEMUYNCK, 2002, p. 72; S.
STIJNS, 2005, p. 60; M.E. STORME, 1990, p. 118.
152 J. BAECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; L. CORNELIS, 1990, p. 579; A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 130; S.
DEBUSSCHERE, 1997, p. 192; P. FORIERS, ‘L’interprétation juridique, ses méthodes et
l’activité du juge’, in P. Foriers (ed.), La pensée juridique de Paul Foriers, Bruylant, Brussels
1982, p. 711; D. LEJEUNE, K. SWERTS & N. PEETERS, loose-leaf, II.4-142-142a; S. STIJNS,
2005, p. 60; W. VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER, 2010, p. 97.
153 A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 30; F. DE LY, 1991–1992, p. 1155; W. VAN GERVEN & S.
COVEMAEKER, 2010, p. 97.
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fairness, and good faith must be involved in interpretation, since parties should
be considered not to have had unreasonable nor unfair intentions. An
unreasonable interpretation could, under no circumstances, have been the
common intention of the parties, at the most it might have been the intention of
one contracting party.154 Moreover, good faith must not only be involved but also
even has to precede interpretation. First, it needs to be established how the
parties should reasonably have understood the contractual arrangement, and only
when more than one reasonable interpretation can be put forward, the will of the
parties comes up. This order emerges from the division of the Belgian Civil Code:
Articles 1134 and 1135 CC are, under the heading general provisions, mentioned
first, whereas the special provisions on interpretation are deliberated upon later
on.155
Storme’s thesis provokes critique, since it exaggerates the function of good
faith and minimizes the role of party autonomy.156 After all, it has as a
consequence that what the parties should have meant according to good faith in
the opinion of the interpreter might be put in place of the unmistakable will of
the parties, because the will is appreciated as being unreasonable.157 Contrary to
the reasonable interpretation, this approach favours a way of interpreting in
which the interpreter changes provisions of the contract as he himself sees fit.158
Therefore, the concept hardly can be called interpretation, since the contractual
rights and obligations are not established by interpreting the contract but
construed by the interpreter on the basis of objective good faith.159 Moreover, a
normative viewpoint is at odds with Article 1156 et seq. CC, which centres around
the common intention of the parties and not around what the parties should have
meant.160 In addition, attributing a broad sense to interpretation might be
disadvantageous for legal certainty.161 Furthermore, it withdraws gap filling and
moderation to a large extent from the reviewing power of the Court of Cassation,
since interpretation belongs to the unassailable factual appraisal of the lower
154 M.E. STORME, 1990, pp. 119–120.
155 Ibid., pp. 120, 127.
156 J. BAECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; L. CORNELIS, 1990, p. 545; A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 30; R.
KRUITHOF, ‘La théorie de l’apparence dans une nouvelle phase’, RCJB 1991, p. 81; R.
KRUITHOF, H. BOCKEN, F. DE LY & B. DE TEMMERMAN, 1994, p. 445; S. STIJNS, JT 1990,
pp. 35–36; S. STIJNS, 2005, p. 60; W. VAN GERVEN & A. DEWAELE, 1986, pp. 104–105; W.
VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER, 2010, p. 97; B. VEECKMANS, 2000, p. 348.
157 J. BAECK, loose-leaf, w.p.; A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 30; S. STIJNS, 2005, 60; W. VAN GERVEN
& S. COVEMAEKER, 2010, p. 97.
158 W. VAN GERVEN & S. COVEMAEKER, 2010, p. 97.
159 L. CORNELIS, 2000, p. 283; L. CORNELIS, 1990, p. 581; A. DE BOECK, 2010, p. 30.
160 J. BAECK, loose-leaf, w.p.
161 Ibid., w.p.
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judge.162 Besides, this expansive viewpoint on interpretation is irreconcilable with
the evidential value of writings.163 Consistent with the rules of evidence (Arts
1319, 1320, and 1322 CC), the meaning bestowed upon a contract by way of
interpretation has to be compatible with its terms. The interpreting judge has to
make sure he does not allow any evidence that goes above or against the content
of the written agreement. Gap-filling concerns situations the parties did not
foresee and, therefore, are not included in the agreement. If the judge would add
to the agreement under the pretext of interpreting, he would accept evidence
above the content of the act. On the other hand, abuse of the law presupposes
that a party acts performing a contractual right. If a judge, again pretending to
interpret, denies or moderates contractual rights, he would tolerate evidence that
goes against the content of the agreement. Such a broad view on interpretation is
therefore difficult to reconcile with the case law of the Belgian Court of
Cassation.164
6. The Role of Business Common Sense
In Rainy Sky S.A. and Others v. Kookmin Bank, Lord Clarke repeats the
importance of business common sense, a notion that is mentioned by Lord
Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v. West Bromwich Building
Society, where he summarized the reigning view on contractual interpretation in
five principles. The last one of the principles states:
The ‘rule’ that words should be given their ‘natural and ordinary meaning’
reflects the common sense proposition that we do not easily accept that people
have made linguistic mistakes, particularly in formal documents. On the other
hand, if one would nevertheless conclude from the background that something
must have gone wrong with the language, the law does not require judges to
attribute to the parties an intention which they plainly could not have had.
Lord Diplock made this point more vigorously when he said in The Antaios
Compania Neviera SA v. Salen Rederierna AB [1985] 1 AC 191, 201: ‘… if
detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is
going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business common sense, it must be
made to yield to business common sense’.
Lord Hoffmann does not attach business common sense to the intention of the
parties, as might seem on first sight. The law does not require judges to attribute
to the parties an intention which they plainly could not have had should not be
162 S. STIJNS, 2005, p. 60.
163 W. DE BONDT, 1996–1997, p. 1013; B. VEECKMANS, 2000, p. 349.
164 Ibid., 1996–1997, p. 1013.
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connected to the real intention of Article 1156 CC but to the hypothetical
intention of Article 1157 et seq. CC. The underlying principle is after all the
presupposition that contracting parties are reasonable persons, which has a legal
ground in Articles 1157 and 1158 CC, two rules on how to ascertain the
hypothetical intention based on reasonableness. Especially, the second aspect of
Article 1157 CC is revealing. It is an application of common sense to state that
when a provision in a contract is capable of two meanings, the meaning that
makes sense should be preferred. Besides, business common sense also fits in the
concept of reasonable interpretation. Good faith refers to the demands of social
intercourse: acting in line with good faith is acting like a normal reasonable
person in the same circumstances would have done.165 It is logical that a normal
reasonable (business)man acts according to (business) common sense.
Business common sense thus plays a role in Belgian interpretation, in the
subjective approach as well as in the objective one.
6.1. Application to the Facts
Following Lord Clarke in Rainy Sky S.A. and Others v. Kookmin Bank, it has to
be accepted that two different constructions of the Bonds are arguable. The
Bank’s interpretation is that the Bonds did not cover refunds in the event of
insolvency under Article XII.3 of the Contracts. The Buyers’ interpretation is that
the Bank’s promise in paragraph [3] was that in the sentence in consideration of
your [i.e., the Buyers’] agreement to make the pre-delivery instalments . . . we
hereby, as primary obligor, promise to pay to you, your successors and assigns, on
your first written demand, all such sums due to you under the Contract…, the
terms all such sums are a reference to the pre-delivery instalments at the
beginning of paragraph [3].
Lord Clarke indicates the following: Since the language of paragraph [3] is
capable of two meanings it is appropriate for the court to have regard to
considerations of commercial common sense in resolving the question what a
reasonable person would have understood the parties to have meant. If the Bank’s
construction of the Bonds would be followed, the surprising and uncommercial
consequence would result from it that the Buyers would not be able to call on the
Bonds on the happening of the event, namely insolvency of the Builder, for which
the security of an advance payment bond was most likely to be needed. Such an
interpretation therefore makes no commercial sense.
Would the same result be attained in Belgium?
As stated before, the Bonds in Rainy Sky S.A. and Others v. Kookmin Bank
would, in Belgium, be characterized as a garantie bancaire à première demande
and, more in detail, as a garantie de remboursement or a garantie de restitution
165 L. CORNELIS, 1990, p. 564.
1354
d’acomptes. Such a bank guarantee has an autonomous and abstract character that
gives rise to literalism, meaning that the content of the guarantor’s obligations
are exclusively determined by the guarantee contract or letter of guarantee
itself.166 This very formal approach is the guiding interpretation principle in the
field of bank guarantees, which results in a very limited interpretation power of
any interpreter.167
However, in the case at hand, a purely literalist interpretation cannot be
maintained, since it leads to two different plausible interpretations. But how to
overcome this deadlock? In a judgment of the Commercial Court of Turnout,
some guidelines can be found.168
A bank guarantee, drafted in Antwerpen on 26 September 1991, stated
that it would be released on 7 October 1991. By way of registered post, the
beneficiary of the guarantee appealed to the bank guarantee on 7 July 1993. The
bank refused to comply with the demand, because the bank guarantee has expired
since 7 October 1991. The judge said:
As the provision is clear, and it constitutes the law between the parties, there is
no need for gap-filling nor interpretation. The argumentation of the claimant,
to the extent that she expects the Court to interpret the clear provisions
according to reasonableness and fairness, cannot be followed […] Ultimately, it
needs to be taken in consideration that, when the claimant thinks that there is
a discrepancy […], the alleged discrepancy needs to be interpreted in favour of
the party who has committed herself, which is in this case the defendant.
Three directions can be derived from this judgment. First, if there is no need for
gap filling or interpretation, because the provisions are clear, this, a contrario,
166 Brussels 5 Apr. 1990, TBH 1992, p. 82, note; Brussels 26 Jun. 1992, TBH 1994, p. 51, note P.
LEFEBVRE; Comm. C. Brussels 15 Dec. 1992, TBH 1993, p. 1055, note J. BUYLE & X.
THUNIS; Comm. C. Namur 12 Sep. 1994, JLMB 1995, p. 801, note X. FOSSOUL; TBH 1995, p.
67; Comm. C. Turnhout 30 Oct. 1995, RW 1996–1997, p. 328; Comm. C. Brussels 5 Feb. 1996,
RW 1996–1997, p. 1263; Liège 24 Sep. 1999, DAOR 1999, p. 206; JLMB 2000, p. 1693; TBH
2000, p. 734, note J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX; Brussels 14 Feb. 2000, DAOR 2000, p. 269,
note C. LEWALLE; Rev. not. b. 2000, p. 403; Comm. C. Brussels 11 Dec. 2001, TBH 2003, p.
57, note J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX; Brussels 26 Apr. 2002, NJW 2003, p. 278, note R.
STEENNOT; Brussels 24 Feb. 2004, JT 2005, p. 68; Comm. C. Leuven 18 May 2004, TBH 2006,
p. 106; Antwerpen 6 Dec. 2006, RW 2008–2009, p. 370; err. RW 2008–2009, p. 471; Cass. 24
Apr. 2009, Arr. Cass. 2009, p. 1103; RW 2010–2011, p. 1301, note E. NORDIN; Brussels 28
May 2009, JLMB 2009, p. 1867; NJW 2010, p. 325, note R. STEENNOT; C. BORMS, 2007, p.
84; P. COLLE, 2007–2008, p. 181; D. DE MAREZ, 2000, p. 308; D. DE MAREZ, 2000–2001, p.
321; E. NORDIN, 2010–2011, p. 1287.
167 D. DE MAREZ, 2000, pp. 308–309.
168 Comm. C. Turnhout 30 Oct. 1995, RW 1996–1997, p. 328.
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means that gap filling or interpretation is appropriate in case the contract is
ambiguous. Second, the argumentation of the claimant, to the extent that she
expects the Court to interpret the clear provisions according to reasonableness
and fairness, cannot be followed, because the provisions are clear. Another a
contrario reasoning derives from those words that an interpretation consistent
with reasonableness and fairness can come into play in case of ambiguity. Third,
the judgment clearly states that an alleged discrepancy needs to be interpreted in
favour of the party who has committed herself, which is in this case the defendant,
which is a paraphrase of Article 1162 CC.
The fact that an interpretation according to good faith is possible in the
case of bank guarantees, undermining the principle of literalism, is acknowledged
by the above-mentioned judgment from the Court of Appeal of Liège, in which
the Court judged that the guarantee formalism does not free the guarantor from
the obligation to perform his commitments in good faith.169 The Court stated that
the guarantor cannot invoke formal deficiencies, when doing so would be
inconsistent with la loyauté et confiance réciproques en correlation avec les usages
admis en affaires.
Another guideline is to be gathered from judgments from the Commercial
Court of Brussels.
By way of a repayment guarantee, a bank had committed itself to refund an
advance payment that amounted to a sum of DEM 140,220. The contract
provided that the guarantee would enter into force when a sum of DEM 140,220
would have been deposited. Due to fiscal legislation, 14 per cent of the total sum
was restrained, so that only DEM 123,000 was deposited. When the beneficiary
demanded repayment, the bank refused, stating that the guarantee had never
taken effect. The Court judged that the scope of the conditions were clear from the
letter of guarantee, because the amount of DEM 140.220 is accurately mentioned.
Contrary to the argumentation of the plaintiff, the Bank does not have to
investigate which was the intention of the parties.170
In a case where a counter guarantee did not contain any indication
regarding the currency in which it had to be paid, nor regarding the place of
payment, the Commercial Court of Brussels judged that in view of intrinsic as
well as extrinsic elements it should be investigated, which was the common
intention of the parties.171
Again, an a contrario reasoning imposes itself. If no search for the
common intention is needed when the provisions are clear, an interpretation
according to the real will of the parties is appropriate when the contract is
ambiguous.
169 Liège 24 Sep. 1999, TBH 2000, p. 734.
170 Comm. C. Brussels 5 Feb. 1996, RW 1996–1997, p. 1263.
171 Comm. C. Brussels 11 Dec. 2001, TBH 2003, p. 57, note J. BUYLE & M. DELIERNEUX.
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The analysis of case law and legal doctrine creates the following picture. A
bank guarantee has an autonomous, abstract, and literalist character, which
means that the provisions of the guarantee contract or letter of guarantee should
be interpreted literally in order to define the content of the guarantor’s
obligations. However, when a literalist approach cannot solve the interpretation
problem, the common interpretation rules, consisting of subjective as well as
objective rules, come into play.
Applied to the facts of Rainy Sky S.A. and Others v. Kookmin Bank, this
means that the interpretation rules of Article 1156 et seq. CC will come into play.
First, verifying the real intention of the parties, according to Article 1156
CC, seems not possible in this case. Second, the judge will check whether the
rules to discover the parties’ hypothetical intention are useful. Among these rules,
Articles 1158 and 1161 CC might be invoked, which would result in a judgment
that favours the interpretation of the Buyers. After all, if the Buyers would not be
able to call on the Bonds in case of insolvency of the Builder, this would not
coincide with the economy and the general content of the contract. Besides, a
reasonable interpretation might be invoked. In that case, the judge would be led
by the sense that one can reasonably attach to the mutually made declarations,
paying attention to the surrounding circumstances, which would lead to the same
outcome as defended by Lord Clarke: a judgment in favour of the Buyers on the
basis of business common sense.
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